Saturday, February 26, 2011
"Espionage: special operations". Mikhail Kryzhanovsky, KGB
1. “Domino” or “chain reaction.” A coup, revolution or civil war in one country provokes the same actions in other countries (neighbors). It doesn't matter what country is going to be next, most important - what country is a target.
2. “False flag”. The planned, but never executed, 1962 Operation Northwoods plot by the U.S. administration for a war with Cuba involved scenarios such as hijacking a passenger plane and blaming it on Cuba.
3. “Sliding” strategy. Transformation of a secret operation into an open one: support of illegal opposition/coup.
4. “Restriction.” You damage (limit) international and economic connections (projects) of the enemy.
5. “Monopoly.” Special operation to keep country’s monopoly or status as economic leader or special (nuclear) holder, or high tech producer. Includes actions to restrict the attempts of other countries to get strategic raw materials and modern weapons and technologies.
6. “Reverse effect.” The government declares a certain goal and launches a military or special operation, but the result is something quite different, possibly opposite. Examples: instead of separating (ethnic) group “A” from group “B” both of them are being exterminated; instead of peace and democracy in a certain region, power is being concentrated in one group and the opposition is being exterminated.
7. “Clash.” You “clash” the government and opposition of a target country and support civil war until the country is ruined and you get it for free.
8. “Salami-slice strategy”. It’s a process of threats and alliances used to overcome opposition. It includes the creation of several factions within the opposing political party, and then dismantling that party from inside, without causing the “sliced” sides to protest.
9. “Positive shock.” A domestic operation; to save the government during a crisis, special service provokes artificial civil conflict or sabotage, imitation (terror), and the government takes care of the “problem.”
10. “Controlled crisis export” (see “Foreign Policy”)
11. “Sanitation border.” “Fencing” the target country by enemies (neighbors).
12. “Alibi.” You build a “chain” of evidence (witnesses) and move the investigation to a dead end.
13. “Passive sabotage.” A very effective strategy used to cover up a major action like the assassination of a President or the destruction of several office towers. You just “do not see the bad guys” who are going to kill the President or blow up the city. In any case you win — the perpetrators are not sure you are watching them; you can arrest them if the object survives or liquidate them once the object is dead. You don’t need a big conspiracy, you just give the order to ignore certain people until their plan materializes.
14. “Special tour.” You help the target country to “build democratic institutions” (the government and local administrations) by sending official crews to help. Actually, they rule the country and that’s a “hidden occupation.”
15. “Mask.” You mask your actual global plans (reforms) by another big action (war).
16. Illegal espionage operations. Very dangerous , because illegal spy is playing born American and can make career in business, becoming #1 Pentagon supplier or in the government, getting to the Congress or even White House.
"Counter-espionage: "mole" detection and spies identification". Mikhail Kryzhanovsky, KGB
John Deutch
"Moles"
A “mole” is a spy inside the government, recruited or “installed” most often within the special services, by an outside government/agency. The 3 most dangerous things a “mole” can do:
1. Calculate President’s plans and decisions judging by information he’s asking for.
2. Manipulate information being sent to President, and thus influence global political decisions
3. Paralyze to some extent the government (if he’s CIA or FBI Director)
How the "mole' sees himself
Special, even unique. Deserving. His situation (career and money) is not satisfactory. No other (easier) option (than to engage in espionage. Not a bad person. Espionage isn’t very wrong – many people
worldwide do it. His performance in his government job is separate from espionage; espionage does not discount his contribution in the workplace. Security procedures do not really) apply to him.
He sees his situation in a context in which he faces continually narrowing options, until espionage seems reasonable. He sees espionage as “victimless” ( government isn’t a victim!) crime. Once he considers espionage, he figures out how he might do it. These are mutually reinforcing, often simultaneous events. He finds that’s it’s easy to go around security safeguards. He belittles the security system, feeling that if the information was really important, espionage would be hard to do (the information would be better protected). He is anxious on initial hostile intelligence service contact. In the course of long term activity “mole” can reconsider his involvement. Sometimes he considers telling authorities everything. Those wanting to reverse their role aren’t confessing, they’re negotiating. Those who are “stressed out” want to confess. Neither wants punishment, both attempt to minimize or avoid punishment.
Methods to detect a “mole"
A. Use index cards (special file) — never use computers to save this information!
Prepare a file on each officer and mark there the signs of a “mole” — has or spends too much money, asks too many extra questions; uses professional skills to check for physical and technical surveillance; has discreet contacts with foreigners; discreet copying of top secret documents; attempts to get a job in most secret departments; talks with close friends and family members about the possibility of making money as a “mole”; behavior deviations — extra suspiciousness, excitement, depression, drugs or alcohol addiction. Three signs are enough to start an investigation — the “triangulation” principle.
B. Use provocation. If a prospective “mole” is looking for a contact with the enemy and is ready to betray, and you have exact information, organize such a “meeting” for him. Do not arrest the person right away — play along, as he may give you connections to other people who are ready to betray. There’s one more provocation method: you supply the suspects with “highly classified information” and just watch what they do.
C. Use “filter” or “narrowing the circle.” Include all the officers you suspect in a “circle” and narrow it until one name is left as the most likely suspect.
D. Make a “model” of a “mole,” judging by information you have on him.
E. Recruit an insider. Recruit a “mole” inside your enemy’s intelligence service and he’ll help you to find the one inside yours (it’s called “grabbing the other end of a thread”).
F. Don’t trust anybody.
What to Do If You Detect a “Mole”
- assess the damage
- restrict his access to classified information and start “feeding” him with fake data
- stop all operations he was involved in and create the illusion they are still in progress
- bring home officers and agents who work abroad and had contacts with him and those to whose files he had access
- start 24/7 surveillance if you’ve decided to play the game and look into his contacts
- arrest the “mole” discreetly (if you want to continue the game)
Effective methods to prevent treason do not exist.
How to Cover Your “Mole”
There are special methods to cover your own “mole” and a “switch” is the most effective — it’s when you “switch” counterintelligence to other, innocent persons who work with the “mole.” You can try information “leaks” through a “double agent” — it looks like you receive top secret information through another traitor or by breaking the electronic security systems. Or you can try information “leak” through publications in big newspapers — it looks like information is not secret and is known to many people or there’s another “mole.”
By the way, was John Deutch, Bill Clinton’s CIA Director, a Russian “mole” covered by the US President? Let's see.
John Deutch was born in Belgium to a Russian father and he was the only Russian CIA Director. His biography is very impressive. He graduated from Amherst College (B.A. in history and economics) and earned a B.S. in chemical engineering and Ph.D. in physical chemistry from Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), where the KGB loves to recruit future scientists. He served in the following professional positions.
1970-1977 MIT Chairman of the Chemistry Department Dean of Science and provost
1977-1980 The US Department of Energy: Director of Energy Research
Acting Assistant Secretary for Energy Technology
Under Secretary
1980-1981 President’s Nuclear Safety Oversight Commission
1983 President’s Commission on Strategic Forces
1985-1989 The White House Science Council
1990-1993 The President’s Intelligence Advisory Board
1993-1994 Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology
Deputy Defense Secretary
1995-1996 Director of Central Intelligence
1996 The President’s Commission on Aviation Safety and Security
1998-1999 Chairman of the Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Since 2000 — MIT Professor and Director for Citigroup. Awarded Public Service Medals from the following Departments: State, Energy, Defense, Army, Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard plus Central Intelligence Distinguished Medal and the Intelligence Community Distinguished Intelligence Medal.
John Deutch was appointed Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) by President Clinton and stayed in Langley for a short period of time, from May 10, 1995 to December 14, 1996. My professional opinion is: John Deutch, a former Russian DCI, is a Russian “mole,” and he’s not been arrested because President Clinton obstructed the investigation and pardoned this enemy of state in 2001.
Three signs are enough to triangulate a “mole” and here they are for Mr. Deutch:
1. Two days after Deutch retired from the CIA, on December 16, 1996, technical personnel discovered at his house highly classified information stored on his unclassified computer, loaded from his agency computer. He refused to explain why he violated strict security rules.
First, a normal Director of Central Intelligence doesn’t need highly classified data on his home computer, because he is a bureaucrat, not an analyst.
Second, here we have a trick — the Internet-connected computer is accessible by anyone with some technical knowledge and you don’t have to send anything — the Russians will read secret information right from your home computer. Simple.
2. In 1997 the CIA began a formal security investigation. It was determined that his computer was often connected to the Internet with no security, and that Deutch was known to leave memory cards with classified data lying in his car. Deutch used his influence to stop further any investigation and the CIA took no action until 1999, when it suspended his security clearances. He admitted finally the security breach and merely apologized.
3. In 1999 the Defense Department started its own investigation, and it appeared that in 1993 Deutch, as Defense Undersecretary, used unsecured computers at home and his America Online (!) account to access classified defense information. As Deputy Defense Secretary, he declined departmental requests in 1994 to allow security systems to be installed in his residence.
4. In 2000 Senator Charles Grassley asked the Justice Department to look into the case. There was no investigation.
5. In 2001 President Clinton pardoned Deutch. There were no comments.
Now, the question is: why is he still in the US if he’s a “mole” under suspicion? I see only one explanation - he has a very powerful friend who can give orders to Attorney General and Secretary of Defense.
P.S. Professor Deutch is still at the Department of Chemistry, MIT. In March 2006 I asked him for an interview. As far as I know, he’s still pondering that request.
Identifying spies
If a spy is an intelligence officer working abroad under “cover” (diplomat, businessman, reporter) you can identify him by:
- following the careers of all diplomats who work at your enemy’s embassies all over the world
- recruiting a “mole” inside the intelligence service (or inside the station)
- setting up your agent for recruitment by the enemy’s station
- watching foreigners who try to make discreet contacts with native citizens with access to secrets
- making a model of a spy (professional behavior, attempts to detect surveillance, attempts to recruit sources or just get any classified information during normal meetings, “throwing away” money trying to get access to government employees, military and scientific circles)
- using secret surveillance and listening devices inside the station and practicing secret searches
If a spy is an intelligence officer working in your country under “cover” of a native citizen (or he is recruited by a native citizen) you identify him by making a model (contacts with identified spies — that’s often the only sign which points out a spy, and that’s why surveillance is very important in getting information from a “mole”).
"Moles"
A “mole” is a spy inside the government, recruited or “installed” most often within the special services, by an outside government/agency. The 3 most dangerous things a “mole” can do:
1. Calculate President’s plans and decisions judging by information he’s asking for.
2. Manipulate information being sent to President, and thus influence global political decisions
3. Paralyze to some extent the government (if he’s CIA or FBI Director)
How the "mole' sees himself
Special, even unique. Deserving. His situation (career and money) is not satisfactory. No other (easier) option (than to engage in espionage. Not a bad person. Espionage isn’t very wrong – many people
worldwide do it. His performance in his government job is separate from espionage; espionage does not discount his contribution in the workplace. Security procedures do not really) apply to him.
He sees his situation in a context in which he faces continually narrowing options, until espionage seems reasonable. He sees espionage as “victimless” ( government isn’t a victim!) crime. Once he considers espionage, he figures out how he might do it. These are mutually reinforcing, often simultaneous events. He finds that’s it’s easy to go around security safeguards. He belittles the security system, feeling that if the information was really important, espionage would be hard to do (the information would be better protected). He is anxious on initial hostile intelligence service contact. In the course of long term activity “mole” can reconsider his involvement. Sometimes he considers telling authorities everything. Those wanting to reverse their role aren’t confessing, they’re negotiating. Those who are “stressed out” want to confess. Neither wants punishment, both attempt to minimize or avoid punishment.
Methods to detect a “mole"
A. Use index cards (special file) — never use computers to save this information!
Prepare a file on each officer and mark there the signs of a “mole” — has or spends too much money, asks too many extra questions; uses professional skills to check for physical and technical surveillance; has discreet contacts with foreigners; discreet copying of top secret documents; attempts to get a job in most secret departments; talks with close friends and family members about the possibility of making money as a “mole”; behavior deviations — extra suspiciousness, excitement, depression, drugs or alcohol addiction. Three signs are enough to start an investigation — the “triangulation” principle.
B. Use provocation. If a prospective “mole” is looking for a contact with the enemy and is ready to betray, and you have exact information, organize such a “meeting” for him. Do not arrest the person right away — play along, as he may give you connections to other people who are ready to betray. There’s one more provocation method: you supply the suspects with “highly classified information” and just watch what they do.
C. Use “filter” or “narrowing the circle.” Include all the officers you suspect in a “circle” and narrow it until one name is left as the most likely suspect.
D. Make a “model” of a “mole,” judging by information you have on him.
E. Recruit an insider. Recruit a “mole” inside your enemy’s intelligence service and he’ll help you to find the one inside yours (it’s called “grabbing the other end of a thread”).
F. Don’t trust anybody.
What to Do If You Detect a “Mole”
- assess the damage
- restrict his access to classified information and start “feeding” him with fake data
- stop all operations he was involved in and create the illusion they are still in progress
- bring home officers and agents who work abroad and had contacts with him and those to whose files he had access
- start 24/7 surveillance if you’ve decided to play the game and look into his contacts
- arrest the “mole” discreetly (if you want to continue the game)
Effective methods to prevent treason do not exist.
How to Cover Your “Mole”
There are special methods to cover your own “mole” and a “switch” is the most effective — it’s when you “switch” counterintelligence to other, innocent persons who work with the “mole.” You can try information “leaks” through a “double agent” — it looks like you receive top secret information through another traitor or by breaking the electronic security systems. Or you can try information “leak” through publications in big newspapers — it looks like information is not secret and is known to many people or there’s another “mole.”
By the way, was John Deutch, Bill Clinton’s CIA Director, a Russian “mole” covered by the US President? Let's see.
John Deutch was born in Belgium to a Russian father and he was the only Russian CIA Director. His biography is very impressive. He graduated from Amherst College (B.A. in history and economics) and earned a B.S. in chemical engineering and Ph.D. in physical chemistry from Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), where the KGB loves to recruit future scientists. He served in the following professional positions.
1970-1977 MIT Chairman of the Chemistry Department Dean of Science and provost
1977-1980 The US Department of Energy: Director of Energy Research
Acting Assistant Secretary for Energy Technology
Under Secretary
1980-1981 President’s Nuclear Safety Oversight Commission
1983 President’s Commission on Strategic Forces
1985-1989 The White House Science Council
1990-1993 The President’s Intelligence Advisory Board
1993-1994 Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology
Deputy Defense Secretary
1995-1996 Director of Central Intelligence
1996 The President’s Commission on Aviation Safety and Security
1998-1999 Chairman of the Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Since 2000 — MIT Professor and Director for Citigroup. Awarded Public Service Medals from the following Departments: State, Energy, Defense, Army, Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard plus Central Intelligence Distinguished Medal and the Intelligence Community Distinguished Intelligence Medal.
John Deutch was appointed Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) by President Clinton and stayed in Langley for a short period of time, from May 10, 1995 to December 14, 1996. My professional opinion is: John Deutch, a former Russian DCI, is a Russian “mole,” and he’s not been arrested because President Clinton obstructed the investigation and pardoned this enemy of state in 2001.
Three signs are enough to triangulate a “mole” and here they are for Mr. Deutch:
1. Two days after Deutch retired from the CIA, on December 16, 1996, technical personnel discovered at his house highly classified information stored on his unclassified computer, loaded from his agency computer. He refused to explain why he violated strict security rules.
First, a normal Director of Central Intelligence doesn’t need highly classified data on his home computer, because he is a bureaucrat, not an analyst.
Second, here we have a trick — the Internet-connected computer is accessible by anyone with some technical knowledge and you don’t have to send anything — the Russians will read secret information right from your home computer. Simple.
2. In 1997 the CIA began a formal security investigation. It was determined that his computer was often connected to the Internet with no security, and that Deutch was known to leave memory cards with classified data lying in his car. Deutch used his influence to stop further any investigation and the CIA took no action until 1999, when it suspended his security clearances. He admitted finally the security breach and merely apologized.
3. In 1999 the Defense Department started its own investigation, and it appeared that in 1993 Deutch, as Defense Undersecretary, used unsecured computers at home and his America Online (!) account to access classified defense information. As Deputy Defense Secretary, he declined departmental requests in 1994 to allow security systems to be installed in his residence.
4. In 2000 Senator Charles Grassley asked the Justice Department to look into the case. There was no investigation.
5. In 2001 President Clinton pardoned Deutch. There were no comments.
Now, the question is: why is he still in the US if he’s a “mole” under suspicion? I see only one explanation - he has a very powerful friend who can give orders to Attorney General and Secretary of Defense.
P.S. Professor Deutch is still at the Department of Chemistry, MIT. In March 2006 I asked him for an interview. As far as I know, he’s still pondering that request.
Identifying spies
If a spy is an intelligence officer working abroad under “cover” (diplomat, businessman, reporter) you can identify him by:
- following the careers of all diplomats who work at your enemy’s embassies all over the world
- recruiting a “mole” inside the intelligence service (or inside the station)
- setting up your agent for recruitment by the enemy’s station
- watching foreigners who try to make discreet contacts with native citizens with access to secrets
- making a model of a spy (professional behavior, attempts to detect surveillance, attempts to recruit sources or just get any classified information during normal meetings, “throwing away” money trying to get access to government employees, military and scientific circles)
- using secret surveillance and listening devices inside the station and practicing secret searches
If a spy is an intelligence officer working in your country under “cover” of a native citizen (or he is recruited by a native citizen) you identify him by making a model (contacts with identified spies — that’s often the only sign which points out a spy, and that’s why surveillance is very important in getting information from a “mole”).
"Counter-espionage: interrogation". Mikhail Kryzhanovsky, KGB
Interrogation is a conversational process of information gathering. The intent of interrogation is to control an individual so that he will either willingly supply the requested information or, if someone is an unwilling participant in the process, to make the person submit to the demands for information.
Remember, people tend to:
-talk when they are under stress and respond to kindness and understanding.
-show deference when confronted by superior authority, This is culturally dependent, but in most areas of the world people are used to responding to questions from a variety of government and quasi-government officials.
-operate within a framework of personal and culturally derived values. People tend to respond positively to individuals who display the same value system and negatively when their core values are challenged.
-respond to physical and, more importantly, emotional self-interest.
-fail to apply or remember lessons they may have been taught regarding security if confronted with a disorganized or strange situation
-be more willing to discuss a topic about which the interrogator demonstrates identical or related experience or knowledge
-appreciate flattery and exoneration from guilt
Procedure
Before you interrogate the object, you have to gather some intelligence on him — examine his documents, read his files (if any), interrogate his partners or co-workers. Then you must establish and develop rapport, when the object reacts to your statements. Rapport may be developed by asking background questions about his family, friends, likes, dislikes; by offering incentives like coffee, alcohol, cigarettes, meals, or offers to send a letter home; by feigning experiences similar to those of the object; by showing concern for the object through the use of voice vitality and body language; by helping the source rationalize his guilt; by flattering the object. Be convincing and sincere, and you’ll control the object for sure. ( Hollywood “insists” on using the “truth serum”, but I can tell you one thing – KGB never used it, a professional interrogater does not need it. I know about tests with Oxytocin, when 130 college students were randomly given a snort of Oxytocin or placebo. Half were then designated “investors” and were given money. They could keep or transfer some or all of the money to a student “trustee”, whom they did not know and could not see. The act of transferring money tripled its value, creating a big payoff for the trustee receiving it. That person could then keep it all or acknowledge the investor’s trust by returning some portion. The investors getting Oxytocin on average transferred more money than those getting placebos, and twice as many – 45% versus 21% - showed maximal trust and transferred it all. Oxytocin had no effect on how much money trustees shared back with their investors, suggesting that the hormone acted specifically to promote trust in situations where there was risk and uncertainty. My conclusion is : you can you drugs like Oxytocin to improve and accelerate rapport, nothing else).
After that you can start questioning using follow-up questions (they flow one from another based on the answer to previous questions), break-up questions (to “break” the object’s concentration, if he’s lying, by interrupting him all the time), repeated questions (to check the previous information), control questions (developed from information you believe to be true and based on information which has been recently confirmed and which is not likely to be changed. They are used to check the truthfulness of the object’s responses and should be mixed in with other questions throughout the interrogation), prepared questions developed in advance of interrogation to gain precise wording or the most desirable questioning sequence (they are used primarily for interrogations which are technical in nature), leading questions (to prompt the object to answer with the response he believes you wish to hear) to verify information.
There are two types of questions that you should not use - these are compound and negative questions. Compound questions are questions which ask for at least two different pieces of information and they are, actually, two or more questions in one. They allow the object to avoid giving a complete answer. Negative questions are questions which are constructed with “no,” “not,” “none.” They should be avoided because they may confuse the object and produce false information.
Never allow the suspect to deny guilt. But it’s good if he is involved in discussion and gives you the reason why he didn’t or couldn’t commit the crime, because you can prove he’s wrong and move him towards offering alternatives and giving two choices for what happened; one more socially acceptable than other. The suspect is expected to choose the easier option but whichever alternative he chooses, guilt is admitted. Also, offer punishment alternatives and deals and lead the suspect to repeat the admission of guilt in front of witnesses.
Tricks:
a) “good cop / bad cop”
b)“story under a story” (after intense interrogation the object tells a different story — which is not true, either)
c) “bombing” with questions
d) pressure by not interrogating
e) “silence makes your situation worse” trick
f) “admit one small episode and that’s it” trick
g) “I help you — you help me” trick
h) “shift” - try to shift the blame away from the suspect to some other person or set of circumstances that prompted the subject to commit the crime. That is, develop themes containing reasons that will justify or excuse the crime. Themes may be developed or changed to find one to which the accused is most responsive.
Remember, every object has a breaking point and there are some indicators that the object is near his breaking point or has already reached it. If the object leans forward and his facial expression indicates an interest in the proposal or is more hesitant in his argument, he is probably nearing the breaking point.
If you are being interrogated,
your major objective is to buy time and use “effective talking,” disclosing information that is correct, but outdated or worthless. I can add also a few words about the polygraph (“lie detector”) , which measures heart rate, blood pressure, respiration rate, and skin conductivity to detect emotional arousal, which in turn supposedly reflects lying versus truthfulness. The polygraph does in fact measure sympathetic nervous system arousal, but scientific research shows that lying is only loosely related to anxiety and guilt. Some people become nervous when telling the truth, whereas others remain calm when deliberately lying. Actually, a polygraph cannot tell which emotion is being felt (nervousness, excitement, sexual arousal) or whether a response is due to emotional arousasl or something else, such as physical exercise. Although proponents contend that polygraph tests are 90% or more accurate, tests show error rates ranging between 25 and 75 percent. My own experience says that you can successfully lie to polygraph. In 1987, while at KGB Andropov Intelligence Institute, I was tested by “lie detector”, and I failed the first set of questions, like :” Have you ever cheated on your wife?” or “Do you like prostitutes?”. Then I relaxed for half an hour watching other students going through the procedure, and took the test again – this time I tried to stay absolutely indifferent and “programmed” to lie. I won . I think, the best thing is to use “guilty knowledge” questions to make the polygraph reliable – that is, questions based on specific information that only a guilty person would know ( such as the place where the object (a “mole”) had a “brush contact” with intelligence officer) – the idea is that guilty person would recognize these specific cues and respond in a different way than an innocent person.
"Espionage: working with secret sources". Mikhail Kryzhanovsky, KGB
"Golden" rules.
1. Do not tell the agent about problems and mistakes of the agency, about your personal problems, about other agents, about his own file and compromising information you have on him.
2. Don’t show him any classified documents — you might provoke him to sell the information to somebody else.
3. Don’t trust your agents too much; they can use you to compromise their personal enemies.
4. Never criticize the source — be an adviser. Don’t talk straight if he avoids cooperation or brings you garbage — just reduce or stop payments, or get rid of him.
5. You lose the agent if you don’t pay him for a job well done, ask him to “produce” fake information (to show your bosses how much great espionage activity you have going on) or if you don’t care about his personal security and his personal problems (health, career). And — never give poison to your agent for security reasons.
Questioning the source.
This is of extreme importance — the right question brings you the right answer and top secret info. Give your agent a chance to tell and show you everything he’s brought, no matter how chaotic the story might be or how ordinary the documents look. Don’t make written notices. Don’t bring written questions even if you are talking about some advanced technology — look and be professional. Don’t let the agent analyze the information before he talks to you and don’t let him bring it in a written form — it’s usually not complete; he can lose it; or it may be stolen from him. If there are documents, he has to bring a microfilm. Ask questions — when? where? what happened? why? what’s going to happen next?
After that you tell the story back to him and he adds details. At the end of the meeting give the agent another task and don’t ask him to bring you “something,” because he’ll bring you just that “something” and nothing else.
Remember, questioning is not interrogation; do not bring another officer to the meeting because it will look like cross interrogation.
Teaching the source
Teach your agent to:
- follow security rules while talking to people, working with the documents and especially meeting the officer (some foreign agencies practice open contacts with many people, hoping that the meeting with the agent won’t attract much attention — I don’t recommend that)
- always stay calm in stressful situations
- always keep discipline and come in time
- use analytic abilities working with people and documents — ask yourself as many questions as you can
Checking the source
You can never be sure you are not working with a “double agent,” even if he brings you top secret stuff. Besides, agents are human beings and they make mistakes — they forget about security, spend too much money, talk too much and ask extra questions; if arrested they may not play the hero but will tell everything. Anyway, you can check your source:
a. by fake arrest followed by severe interrogation.
b. through provocation (tell him you know about his “double game” and watch his behavior after the meeting (it’s good to have a listening device or a camera in his house).
c. by making an analysis of all the information and documents he delivers and comparing it with information from other sources.
d. through other agents.
e. through your “mole” in counter-intelligence (if you’re lucky).
f. through technical devices (reading the mail, listening to the phone, secret searching his house and office, watching him through hidden cameras, trying surveillance in the street).
Ellen Rometsch, "Stazi" (Socialist Germany intelligence) agent a hooker who was serving the US Congress and President Kennedy.
Agent termination (one-way ticket)
It doesn’t happen often but you have to know some special situations when you have to terminate the agent:
1. He knows too much (talks too much) and is ready to betray you.
2. VIP agent (politician) is under suspicion and you can’t help him for political reasons (diplomatic, international scandal, etc.) — in such a case an accident could be staged. It happens that the agent is too close to President.
3. Agent was involved in special operations (murders) and is dangerous as a witness.
4. Agent is trying to blackmail you.
5. You need to press (blackmail) other agents.
1. Do not tell the agent about problems and mistakes of the agency, about your personal problems, about other agents, about his own file and compromising information you have on him.
2. Don’t show him any classified documents — you might provoke him to sell the information to somebody else.
3. Don’t trust your agents too much; they can use you to compromise their personal enemies.
4. Never criticize the source — be an adviser. Don’t talk straight if he avoids cooperation or brings you garbage — just reduce or stop payments, or get rid of him.
5. You lose the agent if you don’t pay him for a job well done, ask him to “produce” fake information (to show your bosses how much great espionage activity you have going on) or if you don’t care about his personal security and his personal problems (health, career). And — never give poison to your agent for security reasons.
Questioning the source.
This is of extreme importance — the right question brings you the right answer and top secret info. Give your agent a chance to tell and show you everything he’s brought, no matter how chaotic the story might be or how ordinary the documents look. Don’t make written notices. Don’t bring written questions even if you are talking about some advanced technology — look and be professional. Don’t let the agent analyze the information before he talks to you and don’t let him bring it in a written form — it’s usually not complete; he can lose it; or it may be stolen from him. If there are documents, he has to bring a microfilm. Ask questions — when? where? what happened? why? what’s going to happen next?
After that you tell the story back to him and he adds details. At the end of the meeting give the agent another task and don’t ask him to bring you “something,” because he’ll bring you just that “something” and nothing else.
Remember, questioning is not interrogation; do not bring another officer to the meeting because it will look like cross interrogation.
Teaching the source
Teach your agent to:
- follow security rules while talking to people, working with the documents and especially meeting the officer (some foreign agencies practice open contacts with many people, hoping that the meeting with the agent won’t attract much attention — I don’t recommend that)
- always stay calm in stressful situations
- always keep discipline and come in time
- use analytic abilities working with people and documents — ask yourself as many questions as you can
Checking the source
You can never be sure you are not working with a “double agent,” even if he brings you top secret stuff. Besides, agents are human beings and they make mistakes — they forget about security, spend too much money, talk too much and ask extra questions; if arrested they may not play the hero but will tell everything. Anyway, you can check your source:
a. by fake arrest followed by severe interrogation.
b. through provocation (tell him you know about his “double game” and watch his behavior after the meeting (it’s good to have a listening device or a camera in his house).
c. by making an analysis of all the information and documents he delivers and comparing it with information from other sources.
d. through other agents.
e. through your “mole” in counter-intelligence (if you’re lucky).
f. through technical devices (reading the mail, listening to the phone, secret searching his house and office, watching him through hidden cameras, trying surveillance in the street).
Ellen Rometsch, "Stazi" (Socialist Germany intelligence) agent a hooker who was serving the US Congress and President Kennedy.
Agent termination (one-way ticket)
It doesn’t happen often but you have to know some special situations when you have to terminate the agent:
1. He knows too much (talks too much) and is ready to betray you.
2. VIP agent (politician) is under suspicion and you can’t help him for political reasons (diplomatic, international scandal, etc.) — in such a case an accident could be staged. It happens that the agent is too close to President.
3. Agent was involved in special operations (murders) and is dangerous as a witness.
4. Agent is trying to blackmail you.
5. You need to press (blackmail) other agents.
"Espionage: recruitment". Mikhail Kryzhanovsky, KGB
Recruit a small number of well-informed people.
Do not recruit: - psychos
- volunteers (unless it’s a “mole” or other government employee who brings you top secret information right away. In a counter-intelligence set-up, a “volunteer” will try to get information about you, telling the minimum about himself.)
- persons with low educational and intellectual level
- people under 30 or over 70, unless it’s a VIP. (Did someone get Jim Baker? Dick Cheney?)
- mafia members
- people who are happy with their lives and careers
The best formula when you recruit is a mix of money and ideology (brainwashing). It’s not necessary to sign recruitment obligations — people take that as a blackmail tool. It’s enough if the fellow brings a good piece of information and get paid (make a video, anyway).
Recruitment Pyramid
Priority recruitment candidates in the USA:
President
The White House staff
The Cabinet and federal agencies
The US Congress
Big corporations
Big scientific institutions
Local politicians
VIP world (celebrities — big media, show biz, big sport)
4.2.1 Candidates for recruitment
1. All spies who work in the USA under legal “cover” as diplomats, reporters, scientists, businessmen, actors, artists, musicians, sportsmen have the legal right to make and develop any contacts and invite people to private parties; then they “transfer” these contacts to professional recruiters. Any embassy can invite any politician to official and private parties and “work” with him there. Besides, all those people can invite prospective candidates to their countries or to other country to develop the contact; it’s much easier to recruit abroad. And remember, any contact, any talk, any piece of biography is already information.
2. You can get information about candidates through other agents and through the media.
3. It’s useful to install listening devices in the government buildings or listen to the phones, and collect compromising information on politicians. I recommend listening to the phones all over the city, if it’s the capital of the country.
The biggest mistake in FBI history was made by homosexual FBI Director Edgar Hoover. In 1971 Elvis Presley shook hands with President Nixon at the Oval Office, and was granted a private tour of FBI headquarters. There he volunteered as a secret source - Hoover said “no". Idiiot.
"Espionage: how to run agents". 1. Mikhail Kryzhanovsky, KGB
Mata Hari
You can get tons of information through technical devices but no device can influence decisions made by leaders of other countries. That’s why for thousands of years to come, a reliable agent will be the top tool of any special service, and their actual names have to be kept secret forever, please. A VIP agent (a top government employee) is a very rare thing and depends hugely on luck, because he can make or influence big political decisions. If he has access to the Oval Office, he can change the President’s plans and strategy, and can sabotage political, economic or military actions. When major presidential initiatives fail, time after time, one might wonder who is sabotaging whom.
The most important thing a secret source can get is a reliable information on any possible attempt on the US President’s life, or concerning a decision of a foreign government to start a war against the United States. A professional agent is actually is both an instrument (to get information) and a weapon (to influence or neutralize people).
Categories:
A.“Garbage” (60%), the “no trust “ category.
Recruitment is #1 priority for the officer and a part of his working plan and very often he has to recruit people who are not born agents. You can work with a nice guy, teach him, pay him, press him — and he still avoids any cooperation (busy, sick, on vacation, etc.). It’s hard to get rid of him because, first, you have to explain to your superiors why you recruited garbage and second, there’s a rule: if you want to be very smart and innovative, a reformer, who came here to start intelligence revolution and get rid
of a passive agent, recruit an active one first. Also, agents who work under pressure (blackmail) sooner or later slide into this category.
B. Good agents (30%), middle category. They adhere to the rules of discipline and keep the schedule (that’s very important even if there’s no information), deliver a lot of information that you have to verify through other sources, but don’t show much initiative. Used for regular espionage: go and talk to the object, copy documents, make a recording, take pictures, listen, watch. You can trust them and check often, anyway.
C. Born agents (10%). You are very lucky if you can recruit such people. They betray their country with pleasure and sometimes do not even ask for money because it’s in their character — they are looking for adventure or are not happy with their personal or professional life and seek improvement or revenge. They take risks, have good analytical abilities, good education, make (VIP) connections easily, “crack” any object, play the “good guy” whom you can trust. Sometimes they come to you as volunteers, and if they bring valuable stuff — recruit them.
D. Women. Women are a special category here, as elsewhere, and the rule is: if you can’t recruit a real agent, you recruit a woman. It’s not professional to recruit a woman for a serious operation, but if you want to get to an important object, a woman can introduce you. OK, you can recruit a US Senator’s secretary or a typist from the Pentagon, but it will be on your conscience if she gets caught. Such cases entail a life sentence, usually — how would you feel? Besides, women often fall in love with their objects and tell them everything. Finally, a married woman is much bigger problem than a married man.
You can get tons of information through technical devices but no device can influence decisions made by leaders of other countries. That’s why for thousands of years to come, a reliable agent will be the top tool of any special service, and their actual names have to be kept secret forever, please. A VIP agent (a top government employee) is a very rare thing and depends hugely on luck, because he can make or influence big political decisions. If he has access to the Oval Office, he can change the President’s plans and strategy, and can sabotage political, economic or military actions. When major presidential initiatives fail, time after time, one might wonder who is sabotaging whom.
The most important thing a secret source can get is a reliable information on any possible attempt on the US President’s life, or concerning a decision of a foreign government to start a war against the United States. A professional agent is actually is both an instrument (to get information) and a weapon (to influence or neutralize people).
Categories:
A.“Garbage” (60%), the “no trust “ category.
Recruitment is #1 priority for the officer and a part of his working plan and very often he has to recruit people who are not born agents. You can work with a nice guy, teach him, pay him, press him — and he still avoids any cooperation (busy, sick, on vacation, etc.). It’s hard to get rid of him because, first, you have to explain to your superiors why you recruited garbage and second, there’s a rule: if you want to be very smart and innovative, a reformer, who came here to start intelligence revolution and get rid
of a passive agent, recruit an active one first. Also, agents who work under pressure (blackmail) sooner or later slide into this category.
B. Good agents (30%), middle category. They adhere to the rules of discipline and keep the schedule (that’s very important even if there’s no information), deliver a lot of information that you have to verify through other sources, but don’t show much initiative. Used for regular espionage: go and talk to the object, copy documents, make a recording, take pictures, listen, watch. You can trust them and check often, anyway.
C. Born agents (10%). You are very lucky if you can recruit such people. They betray their country with pleasure and sometimes do not even ask for money because it’s in their character — they are looking for adventure or are not happy with their personal or professional life and seek improvement or revenge. They take risks, have good analytical abilities, good education, make (VIP) connections easily, “crack” any object, play the “good guy” whom you can trust. Sometimes they come to you as volunteers, and if they bring valuable stuff — recruit them.
D. Women. Women are a special category here, as elsewhere, and the rule is: if you can’t recruit a real agent, you recruit a woman. It’s not professional to recruit a woman for a serious operation, but if you want to get to an important object, a woman can introduce you. OK, you can recruit a US Senator’s secretary or a typist from the Pentagon, but it will be on your conscience if she gets caught. Such cases entail a life sentence, usually — how would you feel? Besides, women often fall in love with their objects and tell them everything. Finally, a married woman is much bigger problem than a married man.
"Espionage: coups". Mikhail Kryzhanovsky, KGB
Coups
Coups, like war, are one of the most violent tools of special services and one could be artificially staged in a target country by “feeding” and “pushing” the political opposition or by using VIP agents in the government. Most coups are “Bureaucratic,” and entail mainly a change of leader, usually by person #2. That person might be the trigger or might be induced to practice “passive sabotage” and allow certain others to take over. It is also an example of political engineering. Coups usually use the power of the existing government for its own takeover.
Conditions for a successful coup: -the army is supportive or at least neutral (a coup usually involves control of some active
-portion of the military while neutralizing the remainder of the armed services)
-the leader is out of town (vacation, visit abroad) or is ill
-a political or economic crisis.
-opponents fail to dislodge the plotters, allowing them to consolidate their position, obtain the surrender or acquiescence of the populace, and claim legitimacy
Military Coup
Changing a civilian government to a military one, usually in developing countries.
Conditions: a long-term political and economic crisis that threatens national security and the unity of the country. Military chief(s) eventually let the people elect a civilian president and form a civilian government after “re-construction” of political and economic systems. They usually leave for themselves the right to control further political process. A good example is the attempt of anti-Nazi officers to assassinate Hitler in a coup. On July 20, 1944, Colonel Claus Schenk von Stauffenberg brought a bomd-laden suitcase into a briefing room where Hitler was holding a meeting. The bomb exploded and several persons were killed. Hitler ws wounded, but his life was saved when the suitcase was unwittingly moved away by someone. Hitler was shielded from the blast by the conference table, leaving him with minor injuries. Subsequently about 5,000 people were arrested by the Gestapo and about 200,including Stauffenberg, were executed in connection with attempt, some on the very same day (which means that Himmler was involved and knew perfectly well about the coup).
“Democratic” Coup
A democratic coup would be a change of the government by the most aggressive (nationalistic) political party.
Conditions:
-artificial or actual government crisis
-mass anti-government propaganda
-organized “democratic” movement all over the country
-provoked mass protests (10,000 particiapants and up) and civil disobedience actions
To provoke a mass anti-government meeting you have to bring to the place well-trained group of agitators (bring as many as you can), and they will inevitably attract an equal number of curious persons who seek adventures and emotions, as well as those unhappy with the government (unemployed people, young and old, are usually very supportive). Arrange transportation of the participants to take them to meeting places in private or public vehicles. Design placards, flags and banners with different radical slogans or key words; prepare flyers,pamphlets (with instructions for the participants), posters and signs (to make the concentration more noticeable). It’s good if you place a surveillance team on the top floors of the nearby buildings - they will report any changes in the event; have also messengers to transmit your orders.Remember, if you clash with police and military and a participant(s) is being killed, the conflict inflames right away.
Your people can also infiltrate the spontaneous anti-government meeting and turn it ito a mass radical demonstration with fights and incidents. Key agitators (with security attached to them) have to be dispersed and stand by placards, signs, lampposts; they have to avoid places of disturbances, once they have provoked them.
-the leader of the meeting must be protected by a ring of bodyguards (they protect him from police or help him to escape).
-government buildings must be “covered” by a blockade
“Democratic” nationalistic coup in Ukraine (2004), so-called “orange revolution”. Scenario: acts of civil disobedience, strkes, sit-ins (in the central square), agressive propaganda, mass demands to revote the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election.
Revolution
A change of government and political and economic systems by political gangsters, usually fed, pushed, incited, and possibly funded and equipped by the secret services of another country. (Even the American Revolution would not have succeeded without French military advisors and financial support.) Government buildings are blockaded, the government isolated, all communications and transportation systems captured, government media closed, new government formed.
Conditions:
-political and economic crisis
-mass anti-government propaganda (in the army too)-provoked mass protests and civil disobedience actions -terror and urban guerillas
Self-coup
The current government assumes extraordinary powers not allowed by the legislation. It often happens when the president is democratically elected, but later takes control of the legislative and judicial powers.
Coups, like war, are one of the most violent tools of special services and one could be artificially staged in a target country by “feeding” and “pushing” the political opposition or by using VIP agents in the government. Most coups are “Bureaucratic,” and entail mainly a change of leader, usually by person #2. That person might be the trigger or might be induced to practice “passive sabotage” and allow certain others to take over. It is also an example of political engineering. Coups usually use the power of the existing government for its own takeover.
Conditions for a successful coup: -the army is supportive or at least neutral (a coup usually involves control of some active
-portion of the military while neutralizing the remainder of the armed services)
-the leader is out of town (vacation, visit abroad) or is ill
-a political or economic crisis.
-opponents fail to dislodge the plotters, allowing them to consolidate their position, obtain the surrender or acquiescence of the populace, and claim legitimacy
Military Coup
Changing a civilian government to a military one, usually in developing countries.
Conditions: a long-term political and economic crisis that threatens national security and the unity of the country. Military chief(s) eventually let the people elect a civilian president and form a civilian government after “re-construction” of political and economic systems. They usually leave for themselves the right to control further political process. A good example is the attempt of anti-Nazi officers to assassinate Hitler in a coup. On July 20, 1944, Colonel Claus Schenk von Stauffenberg brought a bomd-laden suitcase into a briefing room where Hitler was holding a meeting. The bomb exploded and several persons were killed. Hitler ws wounded, but his life was saved when the suitcase was unwittingly moved away by someone. Hitler was shielded from the blast by the conference table, leaving him with minor injuries. Subsequently about 5,000 people were arrested by the Gestapo and about 200,including Stauffenberg, were executed in connection with attempt, some on the very same day (which means that Himmler was involved and knew perfectly well about the coup).
“Democratic” Coup
A democratic coup would be a change of the government by the most aggressive (nationalistic) political party.
Conditions:
-artificial or actual government crisis
-mass anti-government propaganda
-organized “democratic” movement all over the country
-provoked mass protests (10,000 particiapants and up) and civil disobedience actions
To provoke a mass anti-government meeting you have to bring to the place well-trained group of agitators (bring as many as you can), and they will inevitably attract an equal number of curious persons who seek adventures and emotions, as well as those unhappy with the government (unemployed people, young and old, are usually very supportive). Arrange transportation of the participants to take them to meeting places in private or public vehicles. Design placards, flags and banners with different radical slogans or key words; prepare flyers,pamphlets (with instructions for the participants), posters and signs (to make the concentration more noticeable). It’s good if you place a surveillance team on the top floors of the nearby buildings - they will report any changes in the event; have also messengers to transmit your orders.Remember, if you clash with police and military and a participant(s) is being killed, the conflict inflames right away.
Your people can also infiltrate the spontaneous anti-government meeting and turn it ito a mass radical demonstration with fights and incidents. Key agitators (with security attached to them) have to be dispersed and stand by placards, signs, lampposts; they have to avoid places of disturbances, once they have provoked them.
-the leader of the meeting must be protected by a ring of bodyguards (they protect him from police or help him to escape).
-government buildings must be “covered” by a blockade
“Democratic” nationalistic coup in Ukraine (2004), so-called “orange revolution”. Scenario: acts of civil disobedience, strkes, sit-ins (in the central square), agressive propaganda, mass demands to revote the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election.
Revolution
A change of government and political and economic systems by political gangsters, usually fed, pushed, incited, and possibly funded and equipped by the secret services of another country. (Even the American Revolution would not have succeeded without French military advisors and financial support.) Government buildings are blockaded, the government isolated, all communications and transportation systems captured, government media closed, new government formed.
Conditions:
-political and economic crisis
-mass anti-government propaganda (in the army too)-provoked mass protests and civil disobedience actions -terror and urban guerillas
Self-coup
The current government assumes extraordinary powers not allowed by the legislation. It often happens when the president is democratically elected, but later takes control of the legislative and judicial powers.
"Counter-espionage: surveillance". Mikhail Kryzhanovsky, KGB
Physical surveillance.
Methods
1. “One line” - officers follow the object forming a line behind him and passing him one by one.
2. “Two lines” - officers form two lines on both sides of the street.
3. “Circle” - officers block the area and start searching (used in case they lose the object).
4. “Fork” - one officer (a car) moves in front of the object, another one — behind, other officers (cars) move along parallel streets.
5. “Box” - used when the object enters supermarket, hotel, restaurant. One or two officers follow the object, the others wait for him at the exits.
6. “Demonstration” - officers demonstrate their presence to press the object and lower his activity.
7. “Provocation” - officers attack the object, beat him, steal (secret) documents. Often used to lower his activity if he’s trying to play James Bond.
8. “Outstrip” - officers do not follow the object because they know exactly where he’s going.
9. “Football” - officers pass the object to each other (car — a group — bicyclist — car…)
10. “Movie” - the crew watches the object in stages: first day — to the subway only, second day — from subway to his office, etc. (used abroad). The crew has to have a female member if they are watching a woman (she could use the ladies room for a secret meeting) and members of various ethnicities (white, black, Latino) because the object could go to a specific ethnic area.
If you’re the object and you’ve noticed surveillance:
Don’t rush, move at the same speed.
Relax at the nearest bar (and relax the crew).
Don’t show how professional you are by trying to disappear, otherwise they could intensify surveillance or even neutralize you (smash your car, beat you up).
Postpone the operation you were engaged in .
Use a “draught” if you need to see your agent no matter what. Change lanes (if you are driving), stop the car and then drive left or right.
If you don’t see surveillance, that means either there’s no surveillance or you’ve failed in counter-surveillance. Discreetly watch the agent who’s coming to meet you and try to detect any possible surveillance; or you may have been “outstripped.”
Surveillance crew mistakes:
The same crew follows the object all day long.
The object “rules” the crew and calculates it (he moves faster — the crew moves faster).
A crew member is too noticeable (unusual dress, haircut, disabled parts of the body, too fat or too skinny, too ugly or too pretty).
The crew starts to search possible hiding places for espionage evidence right after the object leaves (and he may be watching).
The crew leaves traces after a secret search of the object’s house (office).
The crew does not report its mistakes or the fact that they’ve lost the object.
The crew is not professional (using childish tricks like jumping out of a subway train just before the doors close).
Technical Surveillance
1. Visual surveillance. Done through special holes in the ceilings and walls, through the windows from the opposite building (car) or by installing the camera inside the house (you can substitute something, like a clock, for the same thing but “stuffed” with a camera or recorder.) You can use informant as well to watch the object outside his house (especially if you want to do a secret search).
2. Listening devices. The easiest thing is to listen to the object’s phone (record all calls, including those dialed “by mistake”). If you work inside his apartment, make sure you equip the room where he usually talks. Attention: avoid widespread mistake when your agent keeps the listening device on his body; install a miniature device in his clothes or shoes, because the object could try a test and ask the agent to take off his clothes or invite him to the sauna or pool.
3. If you are working abroad, listen 24/7 to local counterintelligence surveillance radiofrequencies.
4. Reading the mail. When you control the object’s mail, remember he could use multiple addresses and PO boxes. Open all the letters with no return address or PO box. Watch when you open the letter — the object could leave a tiny piece of paper, hair, etc. to check if anybody opened the letter. Analyze the text carefully — there could be a cipher or the words with double meaning (jargon), especially when you read mafia mail.
5. Combination of above-mentioned methods
Methods
1. “One line” - officers follow the object forming a line behind him and passing him one by one.
2. “Two lines” - officers form two lines on both sides of the street.
3. “Circle” - officers block the area and start searching (used in case they lose the object).
4. “Fork” - one officer (a car) moves in front of the object, another one — behind, other officers (cars) move along parallel streets.
5. “Box” - used when the object enters supermarket, hotel, restaurant. One or two officers follow the object, the others wait for him at the exits.
6. “Demonstration” - officers demonstrate their presence to press the object and lower his activity.
7. “Provocation” - officers attack the object, beat him, steal (secret) documents. Often used to lower his activity if he’s trying to play James Bond.
8. “Outstrip” - officers do not follow the object because they know exactly where he’s going.
9. “Football” - officers pass the object to each other (car — a group — bicyclist — car…)
10. “Movie” - the crew watches the object in stages: first day — to the subway only, second day — from subway to his office, etc. (used abroad). The crew has to have a female member if they are watching a woman (she could use the ladies room for a secret meeting) and members of various ethnicities (white, black, Latino) because the object could go to a specific ethnic area.
If you’re the object and you’ve noticed surveillance:
Don’t rush, move at the same speed.
Relax at the nearest bar (and relax the crew).
Don’t show how professional you are by trying to disappear, otherwise they could intensify surveillance or even neutralize you (smash your car, beat you up).
Postpone the operation you were engaged in .
Use a “draught” if you need to see your agent no matter what. Change lanes (if you are driving), stop the car and then drive left or right.
If you don’t see surveillance, that means either there’s no surveillance or you’ve failed in counter-surveillance. Discreetly watch the agent who’s coming to meet you and try to detect any possible surveillance; or you may have been “outstripped.”
Surveillance crew mistakes:
The same crew follows the object all day long.
The object “rules” the crew and calculates it (he moves faster — the crew moves faster).
A crew member is too noticeable (unusual dress, haircut, disabled parts of the body, too fat or too skinny, too ugly or too pretty).
The crew starts to search possible hiding places for espionage evidence right after the object leaves (and he may be watching).
The crew leaves traces after a secret search of the object’s house (office).
The crew does not report its mistakes or the fact that they’ve lost the object.
The crew is not professional (using childish tricks like jumping out of a subway train just before the doors close).
Technical Surveillance
1. Visual surveillance. Done through special holes in the ceilings and walls, through the windows from the opposite building (car) or by installing the camera inside the house (you can substitute something, like a clock, for the same thing but “stuffed” with a camera or recorder.) You can use informant as well to watch the object outside his house (especially if you want to do a secret search).
2. Listening devices. The easiest thing is to listen to the object’s phone (record all calls, including those dialed “by mistake”). If you work inside his apartment, make sure you equip the room where he usually talks. Attention: avoid widespread mistake when your agent keeps the listening device on his body; install a miniature device in his clothes or shoes, because the object could try a test and ask the agent to take off his clothes or invite him to the sauna or pool.
3. If you are working abroad, listen 24/7 to local counterintelligence surveillance radiofrequencies.
4. Reading the mail. When you control the object’s mail, remember he could use multiple addresses and PO boxes. Open all the letters with no return address or PO box. Watch when you open the letter — the object could leave a tiny piece of paper, hair, etc. to check if anybody opened the letter. Analyze the text carefully — there could be a cipher or the words with double meaning (jargon), especially when you read mafia mail.
5. Combination of above-mentioned methods
"Special psychology". Mikhail Kryzhanovsky, KGB
Special psychology
1. “Brain washing” (implantation of new ideas). The process is: isolation from outside world (“information vacuum”) — sleep and food limitation (very effective) — “bombing” with slogans - ideological aggression - achieving the result (brain is loaded). The object is now ready to brainwash newcomers.
2. “Behavior modification” (by placing into a group). The process is: initial contact — introduction to a group — mutual interests — mutual activity–mutual ideas — control and prevention of any negative contacts outside the group. No rush, no pressure.
3. Special psychotherapy methods: talk + drugs + blondes + alcohol (used for recruitment)
Alina Golovkova, Russian supermodel
Attention: An alcoholic is more impulsive, untrustful and unreliable; he demonstrates a poverty of ideas and incapacity for attention. He usually has serious personality maladjustments. He’s immature, insecure, oversensitive and anxious. Without alcohol he’s unable to meet and enjoy people socially, and suffers from marked feeling of inferiority. Besides, alcoholics suffer from vitamin B1 deficiency, which leads to anatomic changes in the central nervous system and heart with symptoms like anorexia, fatigability, and sleep disturbances. Other common symptoms are irritability, poor memory, inability to concentrate, heart pain.
4. “Transfer” (the object is placed in a regular hospital and then he’s transferred to a mental health clinic or jail). In jail you can use such methods an accelerated work schedule (to exhaust the object), turning him into a number to traumatize his psyche, physical punishment or a threat of punishment to keep the object tense and depressed; senseless labor to destroy his personality. Remember: the lower the intellectual level of the object, the more aggressive he is and more sensitive to incentive or punishment.
You can actually re-organize any object’s behavior by combining rewards and punishments, exposing him to feared situations and teaching him an instinct of a total (political) obedience.
Imprisonment is a very strong (sometimes — ultimate) tool. My friend who spent 10 years in jail described the changes in his behavior like this:
1st year — aggression as self-defense method (to survive)
2nd year — less personal tension, attempts to adapt the mind and body to the new, isolated way of life
3rd, 4th, 5th — gaining some inside status
6th, 7th — life in jail looks like natural routine
10th — euphoria before gaining freedom
1. “Brain washing” (implantation of new ideas). The process is: isolation from outside world (“information vacuum”) — sleep and food limitation (very effective) — “bombing” with slogans - ideological aggression - achieving the result (brain is loaded). The object is now ready to brainwash newcomers.
2. “Behavior modification” (by placing into a group). The process is: initial contact — introduction to a group — mutual interests — mutual activity–mutual ideas — control and prevention of any negative contacts outside the group. No rush, no pressure.
3. Special psychotherapy methods: talk + drugs + blondes + alcohol (used for recruitment)
Alina Golovkova, Russian supermodel
Attention: An alcoholic is more impulsive, untrustful and unreliable; he demonstrates a poverty of ideas and incapacity for attention. He usually has serious personality maladjustments. He’s immature, insecure, oversensitive and anxious. Without alcohol he’s unable to meet and enjoy people socially, and suffers from marked feeling of inferiority. Besides, alcoholics suffer from vitamin B1 deficiency, which leads to anatomic changes in the central nervous system and heart with symptoms like anorexia, fatigability, and sleep disturbances. Other common symptoms are irritability, poor memory, inability to concentrate, heart pain.
4. “Transfer” (the object is placed in a regular hospital and then he’s transferred to a mental health clinic or jail). In jail you can use such methods an accelerated work schedule (to exhaust the object), turning him into a number to traumatize his psyche, physical punishment or a threat of punishment to keep the object tense and depressed; senseless labor to destroy his personality. Remember: the lower the intellectual level of the object, the more aggressive he is and more sensitive to incentive or punishment.
You can actually re-organize any object’s behavior by combining rewards and punishments, exposing him to feared situations and teaching him an instinct of a total (political) obedience.
Imprisonment is a very strong (sometimes — ultimate) tool. My friend who spent 10 years in jail described the changes in his behavior like this:
1st year — aggression as self-defense method (to survive)
2nd year — less personal tension, attempts to adapt the mind and body to the new, isolated way of life
3rd, 4th, 5th — gaining some inside status
6th, 7th — life in jail looks like natural routine
10th — euphoria before gaining freedom
"Special influence: tortures". Mikhail Kryzhanovsky, KGB
Tortures
Torture is a category of methods of interrogation designed to shock, hurt and humiliate the object and get information or to make him do something (if used for blackmail). Points to remember:
-ongoing torture decreases pain sensitivity
-people with strong will power take torture as a test
-resistance to torture is often a form of hysterics after arrest
-the object could take himself as a martyr if you torture him too much
-torture could damage object’s psyche and you won’t be able to work with him (that’s why we keep terrorists in Guantanamo Bay without trial – we turn them into idiots)
-people usually trust “after torture information” more than voluntary confessions
-there are different types of torture and professionals often combine them
Techniques of psychological torture include:
- fake execution
- complete isolation (“wall therapy”)
- daylight deprivation
- forcible narcotics addiction. Here you can use depressants, stimulants, opiates or hallucinogens (psychodelics): depressants (alcohol, barbiturates, antianxiety drugs
with effects of euphoria, tension reduction, disinhibition, muscle relaxation, drowsiness; stimulants (cocaine, amphetamine, methamphetamine (crystal meth), with effects of fast
- euphoria, exhilaration, high physical and mental energy, reduced appetite, perceptions of power , and sociability; hallucinogens with effects of euphoria, hallucinations, distorted perceptions and sensations
-making the object observe others being tortured (such as family members)
-abuse of object’s national, religious feelings or political views)
The effects of psychological torture are: anxiety, depression, fear, psychosis, difficulty concentrating, communication disabilities, insomnia, impaired memory, headaches, hallucinations, sexual disturbances, destruction of self-image, inability to socialize
Techniques of physical torture include:
-food, water, sleep deprivation
-damage to vital body organs (brain, lungs, kidneys, liver, private parts) plus electric shock. The brain is particularly dependent on a continuous and stable supply of oxygen and glucose.
-rape
-face deformation
-water cure ( the torturer pours water down the throat of the subject to inflict the terror of drowning. In another variation, the subject is tied or held don in a chair, his face is covered with a cloth or plastic sheet, and water is poured slowly or quickly over his face to encourage him to talk
The effects of physical torture are: extreme (unbearable) pain, hypertension, fatigue, cardio-pulmonary and other disorders, brain atrophy.
Torture is a category of methods of interrogation designed to shock, hurt and humiliate the object and get information or to make him do something (if used for blackmail). Points to remember:
-ongoing torture decreases pain sensitivity
-people with strong will power take torture as a test
-resistance to torture is often a form of hysterics after arrest
-the object could take himself as a martyr if you torture him too much
-torture could damage object’s psyche and you won’t be able to work with him (that’s why we keep terrorists in Guantanamo Bay without trial – we turn them into idiots)
-people usually trust “after torture information” more than voluntary confessions
-there are different types of torture and professionals often combine them
Techniques of psychological torture include:
- fake execution
- complete isolation (“wall therapy”)
- daylight deprivation
- forcible narcotics addiction. Here you can use depressants, stimulants, opiates or hallucinogens (psychodelics): depressants (alcohol, barbiturates, antianxiety drugs
with effects of euphoria, tension reduction, disinhibition, muscle relaxation, drowsiness; stimulants (cocaine, amphetamine, methamphetamine (crystal meth), with effects of fast
- euphoria, exhilaration, high physical and mental energy, reduced appetite, perceptions of power , and sociability; hallucinogens with effects of euphoria, hallucinations, distorted perceptions and sensations
-making the object observe others being tortured (such as family members)
-abuse of object’s national, religious feelings or political views)
The effects of psychological torture are: anxiety, depression, fear, psychosis, difficulty concentrating, communication disabilities, insomnia, impaired memory, headaches, hallucinations, sexual disturbances, destruction of self-image, inability to socialize
Techniques of physical torture include:
-food, water, sleep deprivation
-damage to vital body organs (brain, lungs, kidneys, liver, private parts) plus electric shock. The brain is particularly dependent on a continuous and stable supply of oxygen and glucose.
-rape
-face deformation
-water cure ( the torturer pours water down the throat of the subject to inflict the terror of drowning. In another variation, the subject is tied or held don in a chair, his face is covered with a cloth or plastic sheet, and water is poured slowly or quickly over his face to encourage him to talk
The effects of physical torture are: extreme (unbearable) pain, hypertension, fatigue, cardio-pulmonary and other disorders, brain atrophy.
"CIA : ultimate idiots". KGB Mikhail Kryzhanovsky
Hillary Clinton and CIA Director Leon Panetta 1951
- failure to predict the June 1950 North Korea invasion of the South Korea
- failure to predict the “Fall of Czechoslovakia”
- failure to foresee “Tito’s defection” from Moscow
- failure to predict the “Fall of Chinese Nationalists”
- failure to foresee the Israeli victory in Palestine
- failure to judge the mood of the Latin American states at the Bogota Conference in 1948
1960-1961
CIA with the help of Mafia assasins pursued a series of plots to poison or shoot Fidel Castro according to the assassination plots proposed by Colonel Sheffield Edwards, Director of the CIA Office of Security.
1962
Prior to the 1962 Cuban crisis, the CIA reported to President Kennedy that the USSR wouldn’t risk a nuclear war. During the crisis they insisted that the USSR might risk nuclear war. In both cases their National Intelligence Estimate was grossly off-base.
1968.
The CIA supported the Ba’ah Party coup d’etat against the government of Rahman Arif, with Saddam Hussein eventually assuming power.
1980
The Reagan transition team for the CIA (November, 1980) reported the following:
“The fundamental problem confronting American security is the current dangerous condition of the Central Intelligence Agency and of national intelligence collection generally. The failure of American intelligence collection has been at the heart of faulty defense planning and misdirected foreign policy.”
The team pointed out to the following intelligence failures:
- the general and continuing failure to predict the actual size and scope of the Soviet military effort and military sector of the Russian GNP
- the consistent gross misstatement of Soviet global objectives
- the wholesale failure to understand or attempt to counteract Soviet disinformation and propaganda
- the general failure to explain the characteristics of Soviet conventional weapon systems and vessels — for example the new Russian guided missile cruises
- the wholesale failure to understand and predict the nature of the so-called wars of national liberation in Africa and Central and South America
- the consistent miscalculation regarding the effect of and general apology for massive technology transfer from West to the East
- the apparent internal failure of counterintelligence generally.
The team went on to observe.“The unhealthy symbiosis between the CIA and the Department of State is the chief underlying cause of the security position of the United States. The next Director of the Central Intelligence Agency … will be told repeatedly by virtually everyone in policy positions at the Agency that the CIA is a highly professional, non-political agency that produces ‘objective’ intelligence. Those assertions are arrant nonsense. In part out of mutual drive for individual and corporate self-preservation, the CIA has become an elitist organization which engenders unshakable loyalty among its staff. The National Intelligence Estimate process is itself a bureaucratic game. These failures are of such enormity, that they cannot help but suggest to any objective observer that the agency itself is compromised to an unprecedented extent and that its paralysis is attributable to causes more sinister than incompetence.” 1991
The CIA appears to have failed completely to predict the Soviet empire collapse and the end of the Cold War as such. Robert Gates, the fifteenth CIA Director (and later George W.’s Defense Secretary), as much as said in his acceptance speech on November 12, 1991 that the CIA is a mafia: “The people at Langley were more than a team; they were a family. I hope this sense of family, with all that implies, can be strengthened in the time ahead.”
1992-1995.
CIA orchestrated a bomb-and-sabotage campaign against civilian and government targets in Baghdad .The civilian targets included, at least, one school bus,killing schoolchildren; a cinema, killing many people. The campaign was directed by the CIA agent Dr. Iad Allawi, later installed as prime minister by the U.S.-led coalition after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.
1996
The House Permanent Select Committee om Intelligence issued a congressional report estimating that the clandestine service part of the intelligence community “easily” breaks “extremely serious laws” in countries around the world, 100,000 tiemes every year.
1998.
In 1996 the San Jose Mercury News wrote about the use of CIA aircraft, which had ferried arms to the Contras, to ship cocaine to the United States during the return flights. It was revealed also that Central America narcotics traffickers could import cocaine to the U.S. cities in the 1980’s without the interference of normal law enforcement agencies; this led to the crack cocaine epidemic, especially in poor neighborhoods of Las Angeles, and CIA intervened to prevent the prosecution of drug dealers who were helping to fund the Contras. After that the CIA Inspector General Hitz was assigned to investigate these allegations. In 1998 the DCI George Tenet declared that he was releasing the report, which showed that the “CIA did not ‘expeditiously’ cut off relations with alleged drug traffickers” and the “CIA was aware of allegations that ‘dozens of people and a number of companies connected in some fashion to the contras program’ were involved in drug trafficking”.
The Kerry Committee report also found the the U.S. State Department had paid drug ttraffickers (!).
2001
The US lost 3,000 lives at Pearl Harbor in 1941 because someone was instructed not to pay attention to certain intelligence information that was available. Who was managing the intelligence and deciding where to look closer and where to turn a blind eye on September 11, when another 3,000 American lives were lost?
2005
Arrest warrants for 22 CIA agents were issued within the European Union. The agents are alledged to have taken an Egyptian,Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr, a suspected terrorist, from Milan on February 17,2003 for extraordinary rendition to Egypt, where he was tortured.
German Khalid El-Masri filed a lawsuit against former CIA Direrctor George Tenet, claiming that he was transported from Macedonia to a prison in Afghanistan and held captive there by the CIA for 5 months on a case of mistaken identity.
What We Learn from CIA Practice
Nothing positive.
1. The CIA’s history up to today is a history of paralysis.
The grand problem is — our government can’t preemptively handle foreign policy and national security matters because it has no adequate intelligence information; in fact it has no idea (neither has the CIA) what such high level political intelligence information would be.
Yes, I’m talking here about the Senate Intelligence Committee which has primary oversight responsibility for the CIA in Congress. Ask the National Security Agency to start intercepting world leaders’ talks and phone calls worldwide — if we are spending this much money on NSA special intelligence, we ought to be able to intercept the calls and break the coded communications. This information would have to be the essence of the US President’s Daily Briefings and this information has to be the base of National Intelligence Daily Report and National Intelligence Estimate — which is a regular failure of the CIA — many presidents ignore these reports as trash. This information would have to be the basis of National Security Council decisions. Sorry, we don’t have a global US intelligence strategy or intelligence strategists and I’m not going to do the job while 16,000 “good ol’ boys” drink the day away at Langley.
2. I strongly recommend to stop the CIA’s secret funding right now, funding that is not made public or audited by the Congress. The CIA has its own budget but they want more, which they will waste, and some so-called “operations” are financed by secret transfers of funds from the appropriations accounts of other agencies, primarily the Defense Department.
3. You can’t reform the CIA — they are too accustomed to a comfortable existence, uncontrolled and irresponsible, because they, unlike military intelligence, do not function according to discipline, strict and understandable orders and patriotism.
The CIA has to be shut down, and its political intelligence functions and funding have to be transferred to the Defense Intelligence Agency. Platitudes like “the transition period is complex and takes time” are not convincing — military personnel should take over the Langley headquarters with not a single CIA employee (and all the inevitable “moles”) within a week and start cleaning up the so-called top-secret papers and files, 90% of which is “information noise.” While the CIA is a “family” ruled by the so-called “four princes” (heads of four directorates), the Army is a brotherhood of patriots whose leader is the US President, the Commander-in-Chief. He can trust them — show me a single American (or anyone else) who trusts the CIA.
.
- failure to predict the June 1950 North Korea invasion of the South Korea
- failure to predict the “Fall of Czechoslovakia”
- failure to foresee “Tito’s defection” from Moscow
- failure to predict the “Fall of Chinese Nationalists”
- failure to foresee the Israeli victory in Palestine
- failure to judge the mood of the Latin American states at the Bogota Conference in 1948
1960-1961
CIA with the help of Mafia assasins pursued a series of plots to poison or shoot Fidel Castro according to the assassination plots proposed by Colonel Sheffield Edwards, Director of the CIA Office of Security.
1962
Prior to the 1962 Cuban crisis, the CIA reported to President Kennedy that the USSR wouldn’t risk a nuclear war. During the crisis they insisted that the USSR might risk nuclear war. In both cases their National Intelligence Estimate was grossly off-base.
1968.
The CIA supported the Ba’ah Party coup d’etat against the government of Rahman Arif, with Saddam Hussein eventually assuming power.
1980
The Reagan transition team for the CIA (November, 1980) reported the following:
“The fundamental problem confronting American security is the current dangerous condition of the Central Intelligence Agency and of national intelligence collection generally. The failure of American intelligence collection has been at the heart of faulty defense planning and misdirected foreign policy.”
The team pointed out to the following intelligence failures:
- the general and continuing failure to predict the actual size and scope of the Soviet military effort and military sector of the Russian GNP
- the consistent gross misstatement of Soviet global objectives
- the wholesale failure to understand or attempt to counteract Soviet disinformation and propaganda
- the general failure to explain the characteristics of Soviet conventional weapon systems and vessels — for example the new Russian guided missile cruises
- the wholesale failure to understand and predict the nature of the so-called wars of national liberation in Africa and Central and South America
- the consistent miscalculation regarding the effect of and general apology for massive technology transfer from West to the East
- the apparent internal failure of counterintelligence generally.
The team went on to observe.“The unhealthy symbiosis between the CIA and the Department of State is the chief underlying cause of the security position of the United States. The next Director of the Central Intelligence Agency … will be told repeatedly by virtually everyone in policy positions at the Agency that the CIA is a highly professional, non-political agency that produces ‘objective’ intelligence. Those assertions are arrant nonsense. In part out of mutual drive for individual and corporate self-preservation, the CIA has become an elitist organization which engenders unshakable loyalty among its staff. The National Intelligence Estimate process is itself a bureaucratic game. These failures are of such enormity, that they cannot help but suggest to any objective observer that the agency itself is compromised to an unprecedented extent and that its paralysis is attributable to causes more sinister than incompetence.” 1991
The CIA appears to have failed completely to predict the Soviet empire collapse and the end of the Cold War as such. Robert Gates, the fifteenth CIA Director (and later George W.’s Defense Secretary), as much as said in his acceptance speech on November 12, 1991 that the CIA is a mafia: “The people at Langley were more than a team; they were a family. I hope this sense of family, with all that implies, can be strengthened in the time ahead.”
1992-1995.
CIA orchestrated a bomb-and-sabotage campaign against civilian and government targets in Baghdad .The civilian targets included, at least, one school bus,killing schoolchildren; a cinema, killing many people. The campaign was directed by the CIA agent Dr. Iad Allawi, later installed as prime minister by the U.S.-led coalition after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.
1996
The House Permanent Select Committee om Intelligence issued a congressional report estimating that the clandestine service part of the intelligence community “easily” breaks “extremely serious laws” in countries around the world, 100,000 tiemes every year.
1998.
In 1996 the San Jose Mercury News wrote about the use of CIA aircraft, which had ferried arms to the Contras, to ship cocaine to the United States during the return flights. It was revealed also that Central America narcotics traffickers could import cocaine to the U.S. cities in the 1980’s without the interference of normal law enforcement agencies; this led to the crack cocaine epidemic, especially in poor neighborhoods of Las Angeles, and CIA intervened to prevent the prosecution of drug dealers who were helping to fund the Contras. After that the CIA Inspector General Hitz was assigned to investigate these allegations. In 1998 the DCI George Tenet declared that he was releasing the report, which showed that the “CIA did not ‘expeditiously’ cut off relations with alleged drug traffickers” and the “CIA was aware of allegations that ‘dozens of people and a number of companies connected in some fashion to the contras program’ were involved in drug trafficking”.
The Kerry Committee report also found the the U.S. State Department had paid drug ttraffickers (!).
2001
The US lost 3,000 lives at Pearl Harbor in 1941 because someone was instructed not to pay attention to certain intelligence information that was available. Who was managing the intelligence and deciding where to look closer and where to turn a blind eye on September 11, when another 3,000 American lives were lost?
2005
Arrest warrants for 22 CIA agents were issued within the European Union. The agents are alledged to have taken an Egyptian,Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr, a suspected terrorist, from Milan on February 17,2003 for extraordinary rendition to Egypt, where he was tortured.
German Khalid El-Masri filed a lawsuit against former CIA Direrctor George Tenet, claiming that he was transported from Macedonia to a prison in Afghanistan and held captive there by the CIA for 5 months on a case of mistaken identity.
What We Learn from CIA Practice
Nothing positive.
1. The CIA’s history up to today is a history of paralysis.
The grand problem is — our government can’t preemptively handle foreign policy and national security matters because it has no adequate intelligence information; in fact it has no idea (neither has the CIA) what such high level political intelligence information would be.
Yes, I’m talking here about the Senate Intelligence Committee which has primary oversight responsibility for the CIA in Congress. Ask the National Security Agency to start intercepting world leaders’ talks and phone calls worldwide — if we are spending this much money on NSA special intelligence, we ought to be able to intercept the calls and break the coded communications. This information would have to be the essence of the US President’s Daily Briefings and this information has to be the base of National Intelligence Daily Report and National Intelligence Estimate — which is a regular failure of the CIA — many presidents ignore these reports as trash. This information would have to be the basis of National Security Council decisions. Sorry, we don’t have a global US intelligence strategy or intelligence strategists and I’m not going to do the job while 16,000 “good ol’ boys” drink the day away at Langley.
2. I strongly recommend to stop the CIA’s secret funding right now, funding that is not made public or audited by the Congress. The CIA has its own budget but they want more, which they will waste, and some so-called “operations” are financed by secret transfers of funds from the appropriations accounts of other agencies, primarily the Defense Department.
3. You can’t reform the CIA — they are too accustomed to a comfortable existence, uncontrolled and irresponsible, because they, unlike military intelligence, do not function according to discipline, strict and understandable orders and patriotism.
The CIA has to be shut down, and its political intelligence functions and funding have to be transferred to the Defense Intelligence Agency. Platitudes like “the transition period is complex and takes time” are not convincing — military personnel should take over the Langley headquarters with not a single CIA employee (and all the inevitable “moles”) within a week and start cleaning up the so-called top-secret papers and files, 90% of which is “information noise.” While the CIA is a “family” ruled by the so-called “four princes” (heads of four directorates), the Army is a brotherhood of patriots whose leader is the US President, the Commander-in-Chief. He can trust them — show me a single American (or anyone else) who trusts the CIA.
.
"Gestapo practice" Mikhail Kryzhanovsky, KGB
Heinrich Himmler (center), Gestapo Chief Mueller (r).
GESTAPO, secret state political police with unquestionable powers to arrest opponents of the Nazi regime, including Communists, liberals, Freemasons, Protestants, Jehovah Witnesses, Jews. It was responsible for counter-espionage and counter-sabotage
The Gestapo structure:
Referat N: Central Intelligence Office.
Department A (Enemies: Communists (A1), Countersabotage (A2), Reactionaries and Liberals (A3), Assassinations (A4)
Department B (Sects and Churches : Catholics (B1), Protestants (B2), Freemasons (B3), Jews (B4)
Department C (Administration and Party Affairs). The central administrative office of the Gestapo, responsible for card files of all personnel.
Department D (Occupied Territories : Opponents of the Regime (D1), Churches and Sects (D2), Records and Party Matters (D3), Western Territories (D4), Counter-espionage (D5).
Department E (Counterintelligence: In the Reich (E1), Policy Formation (E2), In the West (E3), In Scandinavia (E4), In the East (E5), In the South (E6).
The local offices of the Gestapo were known as Staatspolizeistellen and Staatspolizeileistellen; they answered to a local commander known as the Inspecteur der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD (“inspector of the security police and security services”) who , in turn, was under the dual command of Referat N of the Gestapo and also his local SS and police leader. The Gestapo also maintained offices at all Nazi concentration camps, held an office on the staff of the SS and police leaders, and supplied personnel on an as-needed basis to such formations as the Einsatzgruppen. Such personnel, assigned to these auxiliary duties, was typically removed from the Gestapo chain of command and fell under the authority of other branches of the SS.
What we learn from Gestapo practices:
1. Investigated and fought against all activities which might endanger in any sense the security of Germany.
2. Kept operations simple and effective. Take for example the “public places total control” method: agents were recruited, first of all, at every big restaurant, bar, hotel or store. They delivered information on any client whose behavior was somewhat different from the general one: he was too excited or too depressed, too greedy or too generous, too open or too closed, too well dressed or vise versa, etc. And very often such a client deserved special attention.
3. Aggressive total recruitment — by the end of World War II there wasn’t a single guerilla detachment, resistance or espionage group on occupied Soviet and European territories that had not been in part or completely eliminated by the GESTAPO or SD — 100 per cent professional counter-terrorist and counter-espionage job based on agent infiltration
4. The “Night and Fog” operation. By 1941 the RSHA analysts reported that the “taking hostages” practice was not effective any more as resistance on the occupied territories was even increasing after that went into effect. It was decided that resistance fighters had to be secretly arrested and secretly transported to Germany where, after investigation, they just vanished without a trace. The US in recent years has been taking insurgents and others arrested (often on suspicion alone) in Afghanistan, Iraq, and around the world, and transferring them via secret flights to secret jails in Eastern Europe and elsewhere for “interrogation”. One might have predicted that the public outcry would quickly stamp out any such abomination as the prison at Guantanamo, but as we see the “current incivilities” have already gone on longer than World War II and the camp is still there.
5. The Gestapo was abhorred for using “third degree” methods of interrogation (see “Special Influence”)
6 .The Gestapo had the power of the “protective custody”, a euphemism for the power to imprison people without judicial proceedings, typically in concentration camps. The person imprisoned even had to sign his or her own order declaring that the person had requested imprisonment (ostensibly out of fear of personal harm) – the signature was forced by tortures. People were sent to concentration camps if they, according to the Gestapo opinion, had received too little punishment. It was not only left-wing politicians and trade union activists who were sent to concentration camps. (The Gestapo also arrested beggars, prostitutes, homosexuals, alcoholics, drug addicts and anyone who was incapable to work).
Besides, the Gestapo, actually, copied the KGB (NKVD) very effective structure and experience; they even coordinated joint actions. In March 1940 representatives of NKVD and Gestapo met for one week in Zakopane, Poland to “pacificate” resistance in this country. Then the Soviet Union delivered hundreds of German and Austrian communists to Gestapo, as unwanted foregners, with relevant documents.
7. British and Americans did not want to deal with anti-Nazi. First, it was due to the aftermath of the Venlo incident of 1939, when Gestapo agents posing as anti-Nazis in the Nethrlands kidnapped two British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) officers lured to a meeting to discuss peace terms. That prompted Winston Churchill to ban any further contact with the German opposition. In addition, the allies did not want to contact anti-Nazis because they feared that Soviet dictator Stalin would believe they were attempting to make deals behind his back.
2. Kept operations simple and effective. Take for example the “public places total control” method: agents were recruited, first of all, at every big restaurant, bar, hotel or store. They delivered information on any client whose behavior was somewhat different from the general one: he was too excited or too depressed, too greedy or too generous, too open or too closed, too well dressed or vise versa, etc. And very often such a client deserved special attention.
3. Aggressive total recruitment — by the end of World War II there wasn’t a single guerilla detachment, resistance or espionage group on occupied Soviet and European territories that had not been in part or completely eliminated by the GESTAPO or SD — 100 per cent professional counter-terrorist and counter-espionage job based on agent infiltration
4. The “Night and Fog” operation. By 1941 the RSHA analysts reported that the “taking hostages” practice was not effective any more as resistance on the occupied territories was even increasing after that went into effect. It was decided that resistance fighters had to be secretly arrested and secretly transported to Germany where, after investigation, they just vanished without a trace. The US in recent years has been taking insurgents and others arrested (often on suspicion alone) in Afghanistan, Iraq, and around the world, and transferring them via secret flights to secret jails in Eastern Europe and elsewhere for “interrogation”. One might have predicted that the public outcry would quickly stamp out any such abomination as the prison at Guantanamo, but as we see the “current incivilities” have already gone on longer than World War II and the camp is still there.
5. The Gestapo was abhorred for using “third degree” methods of interrogation (see “Special Influence”)
6 .The Gestapo had the power of the “protective custody”, a euphemism for the power to imprison people without judicial proceedings, typically in concentration camps. The person imprisoned even had to sign his or her own order declaring that the person had requested imprisonment (ostensibly out of fear of personal harm) – the signature was forced by tortures. People were sent to concentration camps if they, according to the Gestapo opinion, had received too little punishment. It was not only left-wing politicians and trade union activists who were sent to concentration camps. (The Gestapo also arrested beggars, prostitutes, homosexuals, alcoholics, drug addicts and anyone who was incapable to work).
Besides, the Gestapo, actually, copied the KGB (NKVD) very effective structure and experience; they even coordinated joint actions. In March 1940 representatives of NKVD and Gestapo met for one week in Zakopane, Poland to “pacificate” resistance in this country. Then the Soviet Union delivered hundreds of German and Austrian communists to Gestapo, as unwanted foregners, with relevant documents.
7. British and Americans did not want to deal with anti-Nazi. First, it was due to the aftermath of the Venlo incident of 1939, when Gestapo agents posing as anti-Nazis in the Nethrlands kidnapped two British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) officers lured to a meeting to discuss peace terms. That prompted Winston Churchill to ban any further contact with the German opposition. In addition, the allies did not want to contact anti-Nazis because they feared that Soviet dictator Stalin would believe they were attempting to make deals behind his back.
Barack Obama 2012: CIA or KGB . Mikhail Kryzhanovsky
CIA KGB
Cuts corners to save money on intelligence. No limitations.
Poor professional training and knowledge. KGB is famous for brilliant analysts.
“Country inside country.” Mostly patriots.
Results first. Use people and get rid of them. Security first. Respect your sources.
Promise and forget. Promise and do it.
Russia as #1 enemy. US as #1 enemy.
Money first. Job first.
Alcohol. Alcohol.
“We are the best.” "No, we are the best".
Unreformable. Too perfect to reform.
Cuts corners to save money on intelligence. No limitations.
Poor professional training and knowledge. KGB is famous for brilliant analysts.
“Country inside country.” Mostly patriots.
Results first. Use people and get rid of them. Security first. Respect your sources.
Promise and forget. Promise and do it.
Russia as #1 enemy. US as #1 enemy.
Money first. Job first.
Alcohol. Alcohol.
“We are the best.” "No, we are the best".
Unreformable. Too perfect to reform.
Barack Obama 2012: Espionage Golden Rules. Mikhail Kryzhanovsky, KGB
1. No mercy, no ideology, no emotions.
2. Intuition is nothing but the ability to watch and analyze.
3. No evidence is evidence in itself.
4. Distrust is a mother of security.
5. Never look as if you are sizing up the person — that’s a sign that gives away cops and spies.
6. Don’t start first if you don’t know the rules.
7. The way you act is the way you think — behavior is a system of codes (information) which could be calculated by the enemy. Watch your face — that’s a shop window.
8. Think fast, talk slow.
9. Avoid self-programming and never think bad about yourself.
10. Don’t smoke, drink or take drugs if it’s not necessary; spare your stomach from very hot or cold food or drinks; avoid too much noise and light.
11. Don’t be shy to lie — the more you lie the more people respect you.
12. Let people talk out and “empty their brains” — then load your information.
13. People never change — everybody wants to get pleasure and avoid pain.
14. “He knew too much” means “He talked too much.”
15. Never ask extra questions — wait. Wait and the object will get used to you and open himself — nobody can stay tense for long.
16. Lonely people live longer in espionage business.
17. “No exit” situation is the one you don’t like or don’t understand.
18. Avoid:
- personal enemies (they fix negative information on you)
- silent types (they notice and think too much)
- other professionals (they’ll blow your identity)
- extra stress (it damages your heart and blood vessels and that kills your brain and your ability to think )
- talking too much
2. Intuition is nothing but the ability to watch and analyze.
3. No evidence is evidence in itself.
4. Distrust is a mother of security.
5. Never look as if you are sizing up the person — that’s a sign that gives away cops and spies.
6. Don’t start first if you don’t know the rules.
7. The way you act is the way you think — behavior is a system of codes (information) which could be calculated by the enemy. Watch your face — that’s a shop window.
8. Think fast, talk slow.
9. Avoid self-programming and never think bad about yourself.
10. Don’t smoke, drink or take drugs if it’s not necessary; spare your stomach from very hot or cold food or drinks; avoid too much noise and light.
11. Don’t be shy to lie — the more you lie the more people respect you.
12. Let people talk out and “empty their brains” — then load your information.
13. People never change — everybody wants to get pleasure and avoid pain.
14. “He knew too much” means “He talked too much.”
15. Never ask extra questions — wait. Wait and the object will get used to you and open himself — nobody can stay tense for long.
16. Lonely people live longer in espionage business.
17. “No exit” situation is the one you don’t like or don’t understand.
18. Avoid:
- personal enemies (they fix negative information on you)
- silent types (they notice and think too much)
- other professionals (they’ll blow your identity)
- extra stress (it damages your heart and blood vessels and that kills your brain and your ability to think )
- talking too much
Barack Obama 2012: Diplomatic Tricks. 2. Mikhail Kryzhanovsky, KGB
Diplomatic Double Talk
Statement Meaning
We are disappointed. We got nothing.
Situation disturbs us. It’s unacceptable no matter what.
There are still differences between There are huge differences.
our approaches to the problem .
We can’t accept this deal. This means trouble.
We reserve the right to use any means
to prevent further worsening of the situation. This means war.
Discussion helped us to understand each
other better. We’ve wasted our time.
We don’t understand your attitude. Stop it immediately.
I’m trying to understand your position. Understand me too, idiot!
If I’ve understood you correctly, you don’t agree. Do you have any other option?
We both will pay a very high price if we don’t
reach agreement. Yes, that’s a threat!
Body Language
It’s very good to have someone in your team who is attuned to, and can read, body language and help you to “crack” your opponent. Here are some signals (codes) and their meanings:
Partner is sitting upright with hands loosely crossed in front of him. He is ready to accept proposal and finish negotiation.
Partner is smiling unnecessarily and is speaking fast. He’s nervous.
Partner looks and turns his lower body toward the exit. He wants to leave.
Open palm gesture. I’m open and I’m telling the truth.
He’s leaning his body forward. He’s ready to assist you to get out of the situation.
Wide open eyes and a smile. He wants to be persuaded.
Raised eyebrows. Negative surprise.
Chin rests on knuckles. eady to listen (with interest).
Neutral facial expression. Unformed opinion.
Gesturing a hand. Adding emphasis.
Indirect gaze. Uncertainty.
Crossing arms or legs. Disapproval.
Leaning back on a chair. Boredom.
Leaning forward. Agreement.
His team’s members exchange glances. They are sure they’ve won.
Barack Obama 2012: Diplomatic Tricks. Mikhail Kryzhanovsky, KGB
Diplomatic tricks
Tricks in diplomacy are usually used to distract your hard working team, shift the emphasis of the negotiation in order to shape the deal on terms of your adversary or manipulate your team into closing negotiation and accept terms you don’t really like. And the tricks are:
“Leap” - your adversary is losing and starts “jumping” from one point to another
“Pile” - your adversary “piles up” problems, tries to provoke a chaotic discussion or stop negotiations
“Empty chair” - a day or two before negotiations start your adversary informs you that he’s not ready yet, trying to press you (or he wants to change location)
“Diplomatic illness” – the practice of feigning illness to avoid participation in negotiations and at the same time to avoid giving formal offense.
“Deaf” - your adversary keeps asking questions instead of answering yours
“Provocation” — your adversary doubts your team’s professional level and your ability to negotiate
“Busy guy” — your adversary breaks negotiation for an hour or two pretending he has to do some very important business (or that he got a very important call).
“Mirror” - it’s a very interesting “programming” trick. The technology is simple: you try to “mirror” your adversary’s style and behavior, adopt a similar posture, use his gestures, and follow the speed of his speech. First, he will like it subconsciously and will be more open to you. Second, you’ll understand better his way of thinking.
“Sandwich” - pressure (often — military) — negotiations — pressure
“Show” - using certain arguments your adversary appeals to your emotions
“Circle” - a very sophisticated trick: your adversary tries to “push” his proposal in different variants and finally comes back to his initial variant, trying to convince you that’s the best choice
“Carrot and stick” - threat (blackmail) plus promises (money). The guy could blackmail you also by demanding to set a deadline
“Student” - your adversary talks too much about the details, asking a lot of minor questions, trying to make you nervous and make mistakes
“Donkey” – your adversary declines the ofer to speak frst
“Ball” - encourage your adversary if he’s looking for “global decisions” and he’ll do a lot of minor favors
“Rubber” - delay, if you can’t predict the result, and press your adversary by delaying the answer
“Last train” - you can press your adversary by an ultimatum right before negotiations are over, if he really is interested in some result. “Spice” the ultimatum with some important reasons and give your adversary a choice of variants.
Barack Obama 2012: Diplomacy Secrets. Mikhail Kryzhanovsky, KGB
Diplomacy secrets
1. Use secret visits (send the National Security Adviser) if the international problem is complex and important — in this way you don’t depend on media and public opinion. Afterwards you can talk, if it was a success.
2. If presidents like to drink with each other, they are ready to deal with each other.
3. Avoid negotiating on major issues at the end of the day, when your energy is low.
4. Negotiate smart, watch your initiatives. The more you tell about your position, the less your partner will tell you about himself, and the higher price you’ll pay. Diplomacy is all about money and the essence of any negotiations is the price range.
5. Any information should be exchanged as a part of a compromise and not merely given away.
6. Always talk less than necessary. Concentrate on facts and never tell other person about feelings (or your family and medical problems). Don’t interrupt others, try to understand what they really want and if they try to manipulate you. Also, resist giving in to interruptions until you have completed your thoughts – “Just a moment, I haven’t finished”. Use Taleyran approximation – if it’s difficult for you to speak up, try to make just one diplomatic statement. If they press you, insist on moving this questions to experts. And use indirect language such as “It looks like” or “You see situation from a very special angle”.
7. No negative emotions - strong emotions indicate weak nerves. Realize that there might be other issues motivating the other person’s behavior and never take things personally.
8. Stop self-limiting behaviors, such as smiling too much, nodding too much, tilting your head or dropping your eyes in response to other person’s gaze. Speak I normal conversational volume, don’t scream and don’t whisper, either, as you won’t be taken seriously.
9. Take a problem-solving approach to conflict, and try to see the other person as your collaborator rather than your opposition. You’d better postpone negotiations than allow them to break down.
10. Fix all questions and don’t be in a rush to answer any of them.
11. The slower you talk, the more confident you are.
12. Never ask straight questions.
13. It’s important to know what questions and when you have to ask. Start with an “invitation” question that does not need a definite answer but opens up the discussion, like: “No matter what reporters say, we’ll start negotiating for arms control.” Proceed with “intelligence gathering” questions, like: “Are you going to abide by our last agreement on the withdrawal of military forces or do we have other options?” Go to “expertise” questions, like: “It’s 5000 soldiers, right? ”
There’s a difference between expertise and straight questions - straight question are like: “Will you sign the treaty?” and these have to be avoided because you’ll get no straight answer right away. Finish with a closing question, like: “I think that’s what we intend to sign? Next time we can start from here.” Or you can press your partner: “Let’s not lose this last opportunity, eh?”
14. Explain your negative attitude in a smart way: give half the information and continue, depending on your partner’s reaction. If you can’t accept his proposal, tell him that the experts may look into it again and come to agreement. If your partner is not a complete idiot he’ll understand his proposal is unacceptable (because the experts have already done all they could). But if he is an idiot, he’ll agree to “kill” his proposals by passing them to the experts.
You start to lose momentum if you start to defend yourself.
15. Stop (postpone) negotiations the moment you start to lose or you could end up in a total failure and that could be used by opposition back home.
16. If you bring ideology - try to win. If you bring national interests, try to find compromise. Be flexible — that’s a sign of strength, not weakness.
17. Don’t make aggressive statements for the media, no matter what.
18. Respect is half a victory, but you usually win when your partner is scared. Avoid open confrontation and respond to personal attacks with humor.
19. Watch the military experts - they are always ready to “push” you. No arms agreement can win ratification without backing from Joint Chiefs, because Congress needs and trusts their expertise, and their disapproval is a strong tool against you in case you ignore their advice. So, think three times before you appoint Joint Chiefs.
20. Take negotiations on the trade deficit very seriously — they often take you nowhere and have zero results as your partner wants you to change your attitude to him completely as well as your international economic policy, while you expect the same favor from him. You can influence one partner but you can’t very easily influence the international system.
21. After you come back home do some positive advertising through the media — in such a way you influence other presidents and future negotiations. If the negotiations resulted in a treaty, “sell” it to the Senate for approval.
22. Negotiation no-nos:- don’t be confused if your partner threatens you — that means he needs your cooperation. Don’t enter into negotiation right away with high demands.
- don’t touch the toughest issues first. Don’t assume — that’s a sign of weakness.
- don’t hesitate to pause or take a break.
- never say “no” to your partner’s ideas — rather, pack them up in one “package” with your proposals. The Reykjavik American-Soviet summit (1986) on intermediate-range nuclear missiles is a perfect example of a “package”. The U.S. President Reagan wanted to include human rights, Jewish immigration and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in the talks. The USSR President Michail Gorbachev said “no”, arms control only. Then Gorbachev attacked – he wanted to put American Strategic Defense Initiative (“Star Wars”) in one “package” with eliminating intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe and reducing NATO tactical weapons and Warsaw Pact conventional forces. Reagan kissed him “good-bye”.
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