"Espionage: special operations". Mikhail Kryzhanovsky, KGB

1. “Domino” or “chain reaction.” A coup, revolution or civil war in one country provokes the same actions in other countries (neighbors). It doesn't matter what country is going to be next, most important - what country is a target.
2. “False flag”. The planned, but never executed, 1962  Operation Northwoods plot by the U.S. administration for a war with Cuba  involved scenarios such as  hijacking a passenger plane and blaming it on Cuba.
3. “Sliding” strategy. Transformation of a secret operation into an open one: support of illegal opposition/coup.
4. “Restriction.” You damage (limit) international and economic connections (projects) of the enemy.
5. “Monopoly.” Special operation to keep country’s monopoly or status as economic leader or special (nuclear) holder, or high tech producer. Includes actions to restrict the attempts of other countries to get strategic raw materials and modern weapons and technologies.
6. “Reverse effect.” The government declares a certain goal and launches a military or special operation, but the result is something quite different, possibly opposite. Examples: instead of separating (ethnic) group “A” from group “B” both of them are being exterminated; instead of peace and democracy in a certain region, power is being concentrated in one group and the opposition is being exterminated.
7. “Clash.” You “clash” the government and opposition of a target country and support civil war until the country is ruined and you get it for free.
8. “Salami-slice strategy”. It’s a process of threats and alliances used to overcome opposition. It includes the creation of several factions within the opposing political party, and then dismantling that party  from inside, without causing the “sliced” sides to protest.
9. “Positive shock.” A domestic operation; to save the government during a crisis, special service provokes artificial civil conflict or sabotage, imitation (terror), and the government takes care of the “problem.”
10. “Controlled crisis export” (see “Foreign Policy”)
11. “Sanitation border.” “Fencing” the target country by enemies (neighbors).
12. “Alibi.” You build a “chain” of evidence (witnesses) and move the investigation to a dead end.
13. “Passive sabotage.” A very effective strategy used to cover up a major action like the assassination of a President or the destruction of several office towers. You just “do not see the bad guys” who are going to kill the President or blow up the city. In any case you win — the perpetrators are not sure you are watching them; you can arrest them if the object survives or liquidate them once the object is dead. You don’t need a big conspiracy, you just give the order to ignore certain people until their plan materializes.
14. “Special tour.” You help the target country to “build democratic institutions” (the government and local administrations) by sending official crews to help. Actually, they rule the country and that’s a “hidden occupation.”
15. “Mask.” You mask your actual global plans (reforms) by another big action (war).
16. Illegal espionage operations. Very dangerous , because illegal spy is playing born American and can make career in business, becoming #1 Pentagon supplier or in the government, getting to the Congress or even White House.

"Counter-espionage: "mole" detection and spies identification". Mikhail Kryzhanovsky, KGB

                                                               John Deutch

"Moles"

A “mole” is a spy inside the government, recruited or “installed” most often within the special services, by an outside government/agency. The 3 most dangerous things a “mole” can do:
1. Calculate President’s plans and decisions judging by information he’s asking for.
2. Manipulate information being sent to President, and thus influence global political decisions
3. Paralyze to some extent the government (if he’s CIA or FBI Director)

How the "mole' sees himself
  Special, even unique. Deserving. His situation (career and money) is not satisfactory. No other (easier) option (than to engage in espionage. Not a bad person. Espionage isn’t very wrong – many people
worldwide do it. His performance in his government job is separate from espionage; espionage does not discount his contribution in the workplace. Security procedures do not  really) apply to him.
 He sees his situation in a context in which he faces continually narrowing options, until espionage seems reasonable. He sees espionage as “victimless” ( government isn’t a victim!) crime. Once he considers espionage, he figures out how he might do it. These are mutually reinforcing, often simultaneous events. He finds that’s it’s easy to go around security safeguards. He belittles the security system, feeling that if the information was really important, espionage would be hard to do (the information would be better protected). He is anxious on initial hostile intelligence service contact. In the course of long term activity “mole” can reconsider his involvement. Sometimes he considers telling authorities everything. Those wanting to reverse their role aren’t confessing, they’re negotiating. Those who are “stressed out” want to confess. Neither wants punishment, both attempt to minimize or avoid punishment.

  Methods to detect a “mole"
A. Use index cards (special file) — never use computers to save this information!
Prepare a file on each officer and mark there the signs of a “mole” — has or spends too much money, asks too many extra questions; uses professional skills to check for physical and technical surveillance; has discreet contacts with foreigners; discreet copying of top secret documents; attempts to get a job in most secret departments; talks with close friends and family members about the possibility of making money as a “mole”; behavior deviations — extra suspiciousness, excitement, depression, drugs or alcohol addiction. Three signs are enough to start an investigation — the “triangulation” principle.
B. Use provocation. If a prospective “mole” is looking for a contact with the enemy and is ready to betray, and you have exact information, organize such a “meeting” for him. Do not arrest the person right away — play along, as he may give you connections to other people who are ready to betray. There’s one more provocation method: you supply the suspects with “highly classified information” and just watch what they do.
C. Use “filter” or “narrowing the circle.” Include all the officers you suspect in a “circle” and narrow it until one name is left as the most likely suspect.
D. Make a “model” of a “mole,” judging by information you have on him.
E. Recruit an insider. Recruit a “mole” inside your enemy’s intelligence service and he’ll help you to find the one inside yours (it’s called “grabbing the other end of a thread”).
F. Don’t trust anybody.

 What to Do If You Detect a “Mole”
- assess the damage
- restrict his access to classified information and start “feeding” him with fake data
- stop all operations he was involved in and create the illusion they are still in progress
- bring home officers and agents who work abroad and had contacts with him and those to whose files he had access
- start 24/7 surveillance if you’ve decided to play the game and look into his contacts
- arrest the “mole” discreetly (if you want to continue the game)
  
Effective methods to prevent treason do not exist.

How to Cover Your “Mole”
 There are special methods to cover your own “mole” and a “switch” is the most effective — it’s when you “switch” counterintelligence to other, innocent persons who work with the “mole.” You can try information “leaks” through a “double agent” — it looks like you receive top secret information through another traitor or by breaking the electronic security systems. Or you can try information “leak” through publications in big newspapers — it looks like information is not secret and is known to many people or there’s another “mole.”
 By the way, was John Deutch, Bill Clinton’s CIA Director, a Russian “mole” covered by the US President? Let's see.                                                                              
 John Deutch was born in Belgium to a Russian father and he was the only Russian CIA Director. His biography is very impressive. He graduated from Amherst College (B.A. in history and economics) and earned a B.S. in chemical engineering and Ph.D. in physical chemistry from Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), where the KGB loves to recruit future scientists. He served in the following professional positions.
1970-1977 MIT Chairman of the Chemistry Department Dean of Science and provost
1977-1980 The US Department of Energy: Director of Energy Research
Acting Assistant Secretary for Energy Technology
Under Secretary
1980-1981 President’s Nuclear Safety Oversight Commission
1983 President’s Commission on Strategic Forces
1985-1989 The White House Science Council
1990-1993 The President’s Intelligence Advisory Board
1993-1994 Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology
Deputy Defense Secretary
1995-1996 Director of Central Intelligence
1996 The President’s Commission on Aviation Safety and Security
1998-1999 Chairman of the Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Since 2000 — MIT Professor and Director for Citigroup. Awarded Public Service Medals from the following Departments: State, Energy, Defense, Army, Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard plus Central Intelligence Distinguished Medal and the Intelligence Community Distinguished Intelligence  Medal.
 John Deutch was appointed Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) by President Clinton and stayed in Langley for a short period of time, from May 10, 1995 to December 14, 1996. My professional opinion is: John Deutch, a former Russian DCI, is a Russian “mole,” and he’s not been arrested because President Clinton obstructed the investigation and pardoned this enemy of state in 2001.
Three signs are enough to triangulate a “mole” and here they are for Mr. Deutch:
1. Two days after Deutch retired from the CIA, on December 16, 1996, technical personnel discovered at his house highly classified information stored on his unclassified computer, loaded from his agency computer. He refused to explain why he violated strict security rules.
First, a normal Director of Central Intelligence doesn’t need highly classified data on his home computer, because he is a bureaucrat, not an analyst.
Second, here we have a trick — the Internet-connected computer is accessible by anyone with some technical knowledge and you don’t have to send anything — the Russians will read secret information right from your home computer. Simple.
2. In 1997 the CIA began a formal security investigation. It was determined that his computer was often connected to the Internet with no security, and that Deutch was known to leave memory cards with classified data lying in his car. Deutch used his influence to stop further any investigation and the CIA took no action until 1999, when it suspended his security clearances. He admitted finally the security breach and merely apologized.
3. In 1999 the Defense Department started its own investigation, and it appeared that in 1993 Deutch, as Defense Undersecretary, used unsecured computers at home and his America Online (!) account to access classified defense information. As Deputy Defense Secretary, he declined departmental requests in 1994 to allow security systems to be installed in his residence.
4. In 2000 Senator Charles Grassley asked the Justice Department to look into the case. There was no investigation.
5. In 2001 President Clinton pardoned Deutch. There were no comments.
Now, the question is: why is he still in the US if he’s a “mole” under suspicion? I see only one explanation - he has a very powerful friend who can give orders to Attorney General and Secretary of Defense.
P.S. Professor Deutch is still at the Department of Chemistry, MIT. In March 2006 I asked him for an interview. As far as I know, he’s still pondering that request.

 Identifying spies

If a spy is an intelligence officer working abroad under “cover” (diplomat, businessman, reporter) you can identify him by:
- following the careers of all diplomats who work at your enemy’s embassies all over the world
- recruiting a “mole” inside the intelligence service (or inside the station)
- setting up your agent for recruitment by the enemy’s station
- watching foreigners who try to make discreet contacts with native citizens with access to secrets
- making a model of a spy (professional behavior, attempts to detect surveillance, attempts to recruit sources or just get any classified information during normal meetings, “throwing away” money trying to get access to government employees, military and scientific circles)
- using secret surveillance and listening devices inside the station and practicing secret searches
If a spy is an intelligence officer working in your country under “cover” of a native citizen (or he is recruited by a native citizen) you identify him by making a model (contacts with identified spies — that’s often the only sign which points out a spy, and that’s why surveillance is very important in getting information from a “mole”).

"Counter-espionage: interrogation". Mikhail Kryzhanovsky, KGB

Interrogation is a conversational process of information gathering. The intent of interrogation is to control an individual so that he will either willingly supply the requested information or, if someone is an unwilling participant in the process, to make the person submit to the demands for information.
   Remember, people tend to:
-talk when they are under stress and respond to kindness and understanding.
-show deference when confronted by superior authority, This is culturally dependent, but in most areas of the world people are used to responding to questions from a variety of government and quasi-government officials.
-operate within a framework of personal and culturally derived values. People tend to respond positively to individuals who display the same value system and negatively when their core values are challenged.
-respond to physical and, more importantly, emotional self-interest.
-fail to apply or remember lessons they may have been taught regarding security if confronted with a disorganized or strange situation
-be more willing to discuss a topic about which the interrogator demonstrates identical or related experience or knowledge
-appreciate flattery and exoneration from guilt

 Procedure

  Before you interrogate the object, you have to gather some intelligence on him — examine his documents, read his files (if any), interrogate his partners or co-workers. Then you must establish and develop rapport, when the object reacts to your statements. Rapport may be developed by asking background questions about his family, friends, likes, dislikes; by offering incentives like coffee, alcohol, cigarettes, meals, or offers to send a letter home; by feigning experiences similar to those of the object; by showing concern for the object through the use of voice vitality and body language; by helping the source rationalize his guilt; by flattering the object. Be convincing and sincere, and you’ll control the object for sure. ( Hollywood “insists” on using the “truth serum”, but I can tell you one thing – KGB never used it, a professional interrogater does not need it. I know about tests with Oxytocin, when 130 college students were randomly given a snort of  Oxytocin or placebo. Half   were then designated “investors” and were given money. They could keep or transfer some or  all of the money to a student “trustee”, whom they did not know and could not see. The act of transferring money tripled its value, creating a big payoff for the trustee receiving it. That person could then keep it all or acknowledge the investor’s trust by  returning some portion.  The investors getting Oxytocin on average transferred more money than those getting placebos, and twice as many – 45% versus 21% - showed maximal trust and transferred it all. Oxytocin had no effect on how much money trustees shared back with their investors, suggesting that the hormone acted specifically to promote trust in situations where there was risk and uncertainty.  My conclusion is : you can you drugs like Oxytocin to improve and accelerate rapport, nothing else).
 After that you can start questioning using follow-up questions (they flow one from another based on the answer to previous questions), break-up questions (to “break” the object’s concentration, if he’s lying, by interrupting him all the time), repeated questions (to check the previous information), control questions (developed from information you believe to be true and based on information which has been recently confirmed and which is not likely to be changed. They are used to check the truthfulness of the object’s responses and should be mixed in with other questions throughout the interrogation), prepared questions developed in advance of interrogation to gain precise wording or the most desirable questioning sequence (they are used primarily for interrogations which are technical in nature), leading questions (to prompt the object to answer with the response he believes you wish to hear) to verify information. 
 There are two types of questions that you should not use - these are compound and negative questions. Compound questions are questions which ask for at least two different pieces of information and they are, actually, two or more questions in one. They allow the object to avoid giving a complete answer. Negative questions are questions which are constructed with “no,” “not,” “none.” They should be avoided because they may confuse the object and produce false information.
 Never allow the suspect to deny guilt. But it’s good if he is involved in discussion and gives you the reason why he didn’t or couldn’t commit the crime, because you can prove he’s wrong and move him towards  offering alternatives  and giving two choices for what happened; one more socially acceptable than other. The suspect is expected to choose the easier option but whichever alternative he chooses, guilt is admitted. Also, offer punishment alternatives and deals and lead the suspect to repeat the admission of guilt in front of witnesses.
Tricks:
a) “good cop / bad cop”
b)“story under a story” (after intense interrogation the object tells a different story — which is not true, either)
c) “bombing” with questions
d) pressure by not interrogating
e) “silence makes your situation worse” trick
f) “admit one small episode and that’s it” trick
g) “I help you — you help me” trick
h)   “shift”  - try to shift the blame away from the suspect to some other person or set of circumstances that  prompted the subject to commit the crime. That is, develop themes  containing reasons that will justify or excuse the crime. Themes may be developed or changed to find one to which the accused is most responsive.
 Remember, every object has a breaking point and there are some indicators that the object is near his breaking point or has already reached it. If the object leans forward and his facial expression indicates an interest in the proposal or is more hesitant in his argument, he is probably nearing the breaking point.

  If you are being interrogated,

your major objective is to buy time and use “effective talking,” disclosing information that is correct, but outdated or worthless.   I can add also a few words about  the polygraph (“lie detector”) , which measures heart rate, blood pressure, respiration rate, and skin conductivity to detect emotional arousal, which in turn supposedly reflects lying versus truthfulness. The  polygraph does in fact measure sympathetic nervous system arousal, but scientific research shows that lying is only loosely related to anxiety and guilt. Some people become nervous when telling the truth, whereas others remain calm when deliberately lying. Actually, a polygraph cannot tell which emotion is being felt (nervousness, excitement, sexual arousal) or whether a response is due to emotional arousasl or something else, such as physical exercise. Although proponents contend that polygraph tests are 90% or more accurate, tests show error rates ranging between 25 and 75 percent.  My own experience  says that you can successfully  lie to  polygraph. In 1987, while at  KGB Andropov Intelligence Institute, I was tested by “lie detector”, and I failed the first set of questions, like :” Have you ever cheated on your wife?” or  “Do you like prostitutes?”. Then I relaxed for half an hour watching  other students going through the procedure, and took the test again – this time I tried to stay absolutely indifferent  and “programmed” to lie. I won . I think, the best thing  is to use “guilty knowledge” questions to make the polygraph reliable – that is, questions based on specific information that only a guilty person would know ( such as the place where the object (a “mole”) had a “brush contact” with intelligence officer) – the idea is that guilty person would recognize these specific cues and respond in a different way than an innocent person.

"Espionage: working with secret sources". Mikhail Kryzhanovsky, KGB

"Golden" rules.

1. Do not tell the agent about problems and mistakes of the agency, about your personal problems, about other agents, about his own file and compromising information you have on him.
2. Don’t show him any classified documents — you might provoke him to sell the information to somebody else.
3. Don’t trust your agents too much; they can use you to compromise their personal enemies.
4. Never criticize the source —  be an adviser. Don’t talk straight if he avoids cooperation or brings you garbage — just reduce or stop payments, or get rid of him.
5. You lose the agent if you don’t pay him for a job well done, ask him to “produce” fake information (to show your bosses how much great espionage activity you have going on) or if you don’t care about his personal security and his personal problems (health, career). And — never give poison to your agent for security reasons.
 Questioning the source.
 This is of extreme importance — the right question brings you the right answer and top secret info. Give your agent a chance to tell and show you everything he’s brought, no matter how chaotic the story might be or how ordinary the documents look. Don’t make written notices. Don’t bring written questions even if you are talking about some advanced technology — look and be professional. Don’t let the agent analyze the information before he talks to you and don’t let him bring it in a written form — it’s usually not complete; he can lose it; or it may be stolen from him. If there are documents, he has to bring a microfilm. Ask questions — when? where? what happened? why? what’s going to happen next?
  After that you tell the story back to him and he adds details. At the end of the meeting give the agent another task and don’t ask him to bring you “something,” because he’ll bring you just that “something” and nothing else.
Remember, questioning is not interrogation; do not bring another officer to the meeting because it will look like cross interrogation.
Teaching the source
Teach your agent to:
- follow security rules while talking to people, working with the documents and especially meeting the officer (some foreign agencies practice open contacts with many people, hoping that the meeting with the agent won’t attract much attention — I don’t recommend that)
- always stay calm in stressful situations
- always keep discipline and come in time
-  use analytic abilities working with people and documents — ask yourself as many questions as you can
Checking the source
You can never be sure you are not working with a “double agent,” even if he brings you top secret stuff. Besides, agents are human beings and they make mistakes — they forget about security, spend too much money, talk too much and ask extra questions; if arrested they may not play the hero but will tell everything. Anyway, you can check your source:
a. by fake arrest followed by severe interrogation.
b. through provocation (tell him you know about his “double game” and watch his behavior after the meeting (it’s good to have a listening device or a camera in his house).
c. by making an analysis of all the information and documents he delivers and comparing it with information from other sources.
d. through other agents.
e. through your “mole” in counter-intelligence (if you’re lucky).
f. through technical devices (reading the mail, listening to the phone, secret searching his house and office, watching him through hidden cameras, trying surveillance in the street).

Ellen Rometsch, "Stazi" (Socialist Germany intelligence) agent a hooker who was serving the US Congress and President Kennedy.
Agent termination (one-way ticket)
It doesn’t happen often but you have to know some special situations when you have to terminate the agent:
1. He knows too much (talks too much) and is ready to betray you.
2. VIP agent (politician) is under suspicion and you can’t help him for political reasons (diplomatic, international scandal, etc.) — in such a case an accident could be staged. It happens that the agent is too close to President.
3. Agent was involved in special operations (murders) and is dangerous as a witness.
4. Agent is trying to blackmail you.
5. You need to press (blackmail) other agents.

"Espionage: recruitment". Mikhail Kryzhanovsky, KGB

Recruit a small number of well-informed people.
Do not recruit: - psychos
- volunteers (unless it’s a “mole” or other government employee who brings you top secret information right away. In a counter-intelligence set-up, a “volunteer” will try to get information about you, telling the minimum about himself.)
- persons with low educational and intellectual level
- people under 30 or over 70, unless it’s a VIP. (Did someone get Jim Baker? Dick Cheney?)
- mafia members
- people who are happy with their lives and careers
The best formula when you recruit is a mix of money and ideology (brainwashing). It’s not necessary to sign recruitment obligations — people take that as a blackmail tool. It’s enough if the fellow brings a good piece of information and get paid (make a video, anyway).

Recruitment Pyramid

Priority recruitment candidates in the USA:
President
The White House staff
The Cabinet and federal agencies
The US Congress
Big corporations
Big scientific institutions
Local politicians
VIP world (celebrities — big media, show biz, big sport)
4.2.1 Candidates for recruitment
1. All spies who work in the USA under legal “cover” as diplomats, reporters, scientists, businessmen, actors, artists, musicians, sportsmen have the legal right to make and develop any contacts and invite people to private parties; then they “transfer” these contacts to professional recruiters. Any embassy can invite any politician to official and private parties and “work” with him there. Besides, all those people can invite prospective candidates to their countries or to other country to develop the contact; it’s much easier to recruit abroad. And remember, any contact, any talk, any piece of biography is already information.
2. You can get information about candidates through other agents and through the media.
3. It’s useful to install listening devices in the government buildings or listen to the phones, and collect compromising information on politicians. I recommend listening to the phones all over the city, if it’s the capital of the country.
The biggest mistake in FBI history was made by homosexual FBI Director Edgar Hoover. In 1971 Elvis Presley shook hands with President Nixon at the Oval Office, and was granted a private tour of FBI headquarters. There he volunteered as a secret source - Hoover said “no". Idiiot.

"Espionage: how to run agents". 1. Mikhail Kryzhanovsky, KGB

                                                                      Mata Hari

 You can get tons of information through technical devices but no device can influence decisions made by leaders of other countries. That’s why for thousands of years to come, a reliable agent will be the top tool of any special service, and their actual names have to be kept secret forever, please. A VIP agent (a top government employee) is a very rare thing and depends hugely on luck, because he can make or influence big political decisions. If he has access to the Oval Office, he can change the President’s plans and strategy, and can sabotage political, economic or military actions. When major presidential initiatives fail, time after time, one might wonder who is sabotaging whom.
 The most important thing a secret source can get is a reliable information on any possible attempt on the US President’s life, or concerning a decision of a foreign government to start a war against the United States. A professional agent is actually is both an instrument (to get information) and a weapon (to influence or neutralize people).

Categories:
A.“Garbage” (60%), the “no trust “ category.
Recruitment is #1 priority for the officer and a part of his working plan and very often he has to recruit people who are not born agents. You can work with a nice guy, teach him, pay him, press him — and he still avoids any cooperation (busy, sick, on vacation, etc.). It’s hard to get rid of him because, first, you have to explain to your superiors why you recruited garbage and second, there’s a rule: if you want to be very smart and innovative, a reformer, who came here to start intelligence revolution and get rid                          
of a passive agent, recruit an active one first. Also, agents who work under pressure (blackmail) sooner or later slide into this category.
B. Good agents (30%), middle category. They adhere to the rules of discipline and keep the schedule (that’s very important even if there’s no information), deliver a lot of information that you have to verify through other sources, but don’t show much initiative. Used for regular espionage: go and talk to the object, copy documents, make a recording, take pictures, listen, watch. You can trust them and check often, anyway.
C. Born agents (10%). You are very lucky if you can recruit such people. They betray their country with pleasure and sometimes do not even ask for money because it’s in their character — they are looking for adventure or are not happy with their personal or professional life and seek improvement or revenge. They take risks, have good analytical abilities, good education, make (VIP) connections easily, “crack” any object, play the “good guy” whom you can trust. Sometimes they come to you as volunteers, and if they bring valuable stuff — recruit them.
D. Women. Women are a special category here, as elsewhere, and the rule is: if you can’t recruit a real agent, you recruit a woman. It’s not professional to recruit a woman for a serious operation, but if you want to get to an important object, a woman can introduce you. OK, you can recruit a US Senator’s secretary or a typist from the Pentagon, but it will be on your conscience if she gets caught. Such cases entail a life sentence, usually — how would you feel? Besides, women often fall in love with their objects and tell them everything. Finally, a married woman is much bigger problem than a married man.

"Espionage: coups". Mikhail Kryzhanovsky, KGB

Coups
 
Coups, like war, are one of the most violent tools of special services and one could be artificially staged in a target country by “feeding” and “pushing” the political opposition or by using VIP agents in the government. Most coups are “Bureaucratic,” and entail mainly a change of leader, usually by person #2. That person might be the trigger or might be induced to practice “passive sabotage” and allow certain others to take over.  It is also an example of political engineering. Coups usually use the power of the existing government for its own takeover.
  Conditions for a successful coup: -the army is supportive or at least neutral (a coup usually involves control of some active
-portion of the military while neutralizing the remainder of the armed services)
-the leader is out of town (vacation, visit abroad) or is ill
-a political or economic crisis.
-opponents fail to dislodge the plotters, allowing them to consolidate their position, obtain  the surrender or acquiescence of the populace, and claim legitimacy

Military Coup

Changing a civilian government to a military one, usually in developing countries.
Conditions: a long-term political and economic crisis that threatens national security and the unity of the country. Military chief(s) eventually let the people elect a civilian president and form a civilian government after “re-construction” of political and economic systems. They usually leave for themselves the right to control further political process. A good example is the attempt of anti-Nazi officers to assassinate Hitler in a coup. On July 20, 1944, Colonel Claus Schenk von Stauffenberg brought a bomd-laden suitcase into a briefing room where Hitler was holding a meeting. The bomb exploded and several persons were killed. Hitler ws wounded, but his life was saved when the suitcase  was unwittingly moved away by  someone. Hitler was shielded from the blast by the conference table, leaving him with minor injuries. Subsequently about 5,000 people were arrested by the Gestapo and about 200,including Stauffenberg, were executed in connection with attempt, some on the very same day (which means that Himmler was involved and knew perfectly well about the coup).

 “Democratic” Coup

A democratic coup would be a change of the government by the most aggressive (nationalistic) political party.
Conditions:
-artificial or actual government crisis
-mass anti-government propaganda
-organized “democratic” movement all over the country
-provoked mass protests (10,000 particiapants and up) and civil disobedience actions
 To provoke a mass anti-government meeting you have to bring to the place well-trained group of agitators (bring as many as you can), and they will inevitably attract an equal number of curious persons who seek adventures and emotions, as well as those unhappy with the government (unemployed people, young and old, are usually very supportive). Arrange transportation of the participants to take them to meeting places in private or public vehicles. Design placards, flags and banners with different  radical slogans or key words; prepare flyers,pamphlets (with instructions for the participants), posters and signs (to make the concentration more noticeable). It’s good if you place a surveillance team on the top floors of the nearby buildings  - they will report any changes in the event; have also messengers to transmit your orders.Remember, if you clash with police and military and a participant(s) is being killed, the conflict inflames right away.
 Your people can also infiltrate  the spontaneous anti-government meeting and turn it ito a mass radical demonstration with fights and incidents. Key agitators (with security attached to them) have to be dispersed and stand by placards, signs, lampposts; they have to avoid places of disturbances, once they have provoked them.
-the leader of the meeting must be protected by a ring of bodyguards (they protect him from police or help him to escape).
-government buildings  must be “covered” by a blockade
“Democratic” nationalistic coup in Ukraine (2004), so-called “orange revolution”. Scenario: acts of civil disobedience, strkes, sit-ins (in the central square), agressive propaganda, mass demands to revote the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election.

Revolution

A change of government and political and economic systems by political gangsters, usually fed, pushed, incited, and possibly funded and equipped by the secret services of another country. (Even the American Revolution would not have succeeded without French military advisors and financial support.) Government buildings are blockaded, the government isolated, all communications and transportation systems captured, government media closed, new government formed.
Conditions:
-political and economic crisis
-mass anti-government propaganda (in the army too)-provoked mass protests and civil disobedience actions -terror and urban guerillas

Self-coup
The current government assumes extraordinary powers not allowed by the legislation. It often happens when the president is democratically elected, but later takes control of the legislative and judicial powers.