Saturday, February 26, 2011

"CIA : ultimate idiots". KGB Mikhail Kryzhanovsky

                                             Hillary Clinton and CIA Director Leon Panetta 1951
- failure to predict the June 1950 North Korea invasion of the South Korea
- failure to predict the “Fall of Czechoslovakia”
- failure to foresee “Tito’s defection” from Moscow
- failure to predict the “Fall of Chinese Nationalists”
- failure to foresee the Israeli victory in Palestine
- failure to judge the mood of the Latin American states at the Bogota Conference in 1948
1960-1961
CIA with the help of Mafia assasins pursued a series of plots to poison or shoot Fidel Castro according to the assassination plots proposed by Colonel Sheffield Edwards, Director of the CIA Office of  Security.
1962
Prior to the 1962 Cuban crisis, the CIA reported to President Kennedy that the USSR wouldn’t risk a nuclear war. During the crisis they insisted that the USSR might risk nuclear war. In both cases their National Intelligence Estimate was grossly off-base.
1968.
The CIA supported the Ba’ah Party coup d’etat against the government of Rahman Arif, with Saddam Hussein eventually assuming power.
1980
The Reagan transition team for the CIA (November, 1980) reported the following:
“The fundamental problem confronting American security is the current dangerous condition of the Central Intelligence Agency and of national intelligence collection generally. The failure of American intelligence collection has been at the heart of faulty defense planning and misdirected foreign policy.”
  The team pointed out to the following intelligence failures:
- the general and continuing failure to predict the actual size and scope of the Soviet military effort and military sector of the Russian GNP
- the consistent gross misstatement of Soviet global objectives
- the wholesale failure to understand or attempt to counteract Soviet disinformation and propaganda
- the general failure to explain the characteristics of Soviet conventional weapon systems and vessels — for example the new Russian guided missile cruises
- the wholesale failure to understand and predict the nature of the so-called wars of national liberation in Africa and Central and South America
- the consistent miscalculation regarding the effect of and general apology for massive technology transfer from West to the East
- the apparent internal failure of counterintelligence generally.
The team went on to observe.“The unhealthy symbiosis between the CIA and the Department of State is the chief underlying cause of the security position of the United States. The next Director of the Central Intelligence Agency … will be told repeatedly by virtually everyone in policy positions at the Agency that the CIA is a highly professional, non-political agency that produces ‘objective’ intelligence. Those assertions are arrant nonsense. In part out of mutual drive for individual and corporate self-preservation, the CIA has become an elitist organization which engenders unshakable loyalty among its staff. The National Intelligence Estimate process is itself a bureaucratic game. These failures are of such enormity, that they cannot help but suggest to any objective observer that the agency itself is compromised to an unprecedented extent and that its paralysis is attributable to causes more sinister than incompetence.” 1991
The CIA appears to have failed completely to predict the Soviet empire collapse and the end of the Cold War as such. Robert Gates, the fifteenth CIA Director (and later George W.’s Defense Secretary), as much as said in his acceptance speech on November 12, 1991 that the CIA is a mafia: “The people at Langley were more than a team; they were a family. I hope this sense of family, with all that implies, can be strengthened in the time ahead.”
1992-1995.
CIA orchestrated a bomb-and-sabotage campaign against civilian and government targets in Baghdad .The civilian targets included, at least, one school bus,killing schoolchildren; a cinema, killing many people. The  campaign was directed by the CIA agent Dr. Iad Allawi, later installed as prime minister by the U.S.-led coalition after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.
1996
The House Permanent Select Committee om Intelligence issued a congressional report estimating that the clandestine service part of the intelligence community “easily” breaks “extremely serious laws” in countries around the world, 100,000 tiemes every year.
1998.
In 1996 the San Jose Mercury News wrote about the use of CIA aircraft, which had ferried arms to the Contras, to ship cocaine to the United States during the return flights. It was revealed also that Central America narcotics traffickers could import cocaine to the U.S. cities in the 1980’s without the interference of normal law enforcement agencies; this led to the crack cocaine epidemic, especially in poor neighborhoods of Las Angeles, and CIA intervened to prevent the prosecution of drug dealers who were helping to fund the Contras. After that the CIA Inspector General Hitz was assigned to investigate these allegations. In 1998 the DCI George Tenet declared that he was releasing the report, which showed that the “CIA did not ‘expeditiously’ cut off relations with alleged drug traffickers” and the “CIA was aware of allegations that ‘dozens of people and a number of companies connected in some fashion to the contras program’ were involved in drug trafficking”. 
The Kerry Committee report also found the the  U.S. State Department had paid drug ttraffickers  (!).
2001
The US lost 3,000 lives at Pearl Harbor in 1941 because someone was instructed not to pay attention to certain intelligence information that was available. Who was managing the intelligence and deciding where to look closer and where to turn a blind eye on September 11, when another 3,000 American lives were lost?
2005
Arrest warrants for 22 CIA agents were issued within the European Union. The agents are alledged to have taken an Egyptian,Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr, a suspected terrorist, from Milan on February 17,2003 for extraordinary rendition to Egypt, where he was tortured.
German Khalid El-Masri filed a lawsuit against former CIA Direrctor George Tenet, claiming that he was transported from Macedonia to a prison in Afghanistan and held captive  there by the CIA for 5 months on a case of mistaken identity.

What We Learn from CIA Practice
Nothing positive.
1. The CIA’s history up to today is a history of paralysis.
The grand problem is — our government can’t preemptively handle foreign policy and national security matters because it has no adequate intelligence information; in fact it has no idea (neither has the CIA) what such high level political intelligence information would be.
Yes, I’m talking here about the Senate Intelligence Committee which has primary oversight responsibility for the CIA in Congress. Ask the National Security Agency to start intercepting world leaders’ talks and phone calls worldwide — if we are spending this much money on NSA special intelligence, we ought to be able to intercept the calls and break the coded communications. This information would have to be the essence of the US President’s Daily Briefings and this information has to be the base of National Intelligence Daily Report and National Intelligence Estimate — which is a regular failure of the CIA — many presidents ignore these reports as trash. This information would have to be the basis of National Security Council decisions. Sorry, we don’t have a global US intelligence strategy or intelligence strategists and I’m not going to do the job while 16,000 “good ol’ boys” drink the day away  at Langley.
2. I strongly recommend to stop the CIA’s secret funding right now, funding that is not made public or audited by the Congress. The CIA has its own budget but they want more, which they will waste, and some so-called “operations” are financed by secret transfers of funds from the appropriations accounts of other agencies, primarily the Defense Department.
3. You can’t reform the CIA — they are too accustomed to a comfortable existence, uncontrolled and irresponsible, because they, unlike military intelligence, do not function according to discipline, strict and understandable orders and patriotism.
The CIA has to be shut down, and its political intelligence functions and funding have to be transferred to the Defense Intelligence Agency. Platitudes like “the transition period is complex and takes time” are not convincing — military personnel should take over the Langley headquarters with not a single CIA employee (and all the inevitable “moles”) within a week and start cleaning up the so-called top-secret papers and files, 90% of which is “information noise.” While the CIA is a “family” ruled by the so-called “four princes” (heads of four directorates), the Army is a brotherhood of patriots whose leader is the US President, the Commander-in-Chief. He can trust them — show me a single American (or anyone else) who trusts the CIA. 
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"Gestapo practice" Mikhail Kryzhanovsky, KGB

Heinrich Himmler (center), Gestapo Chief Mueller (r).

GESTAPO, secret state political police with unquestionable powers to arrest opponents of the Nazi regime, including Communists, liberals, Freemasons, Protestants, Jehovah Witnesses, Jews. It was responsible for counter-espionage and counter-sabotage

 The Gestapo structure:

Referat N: Central Intelligence Office.
Department A (Enemies: Communists (A1), Countersabotage (A2), Reactionaries and Liberals (A3), Assassinations (A4)
Department B (Sects and Churches : Catholics (B1), Protestants (B2), Freemasons (B3), Jews (B4)
Department C (Administration and Party Affairs). The central administrative office of the Gestapo, responsible for card files of all personnel.
Department D (Occupied Territories : Opponents of the Regime (D1), Churches and Sects (D2), Records and Party Matters (D3), Western Territories (D4), Counter-espionage (D5).
Department E (Counterintelligence: In the Reich (E1), Policy Formation (E2), In the West (E3), In Scandinavia (E4), In the East (E5), In the South (E6).
The local offices of the Gestapo were known as Staatspolizeistellen and Staatspolizeileistellen; they answered to a local commander known as the Inspecteur der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD (“inspector of the security police and security services”) who , in turn, was under the dual command of Referat N of the Gestapo and also his local SS and police leader. The Gestapo also maintained offices at all Nazi concentration camps, held an office on the staff of the SS and police leaders, and supplied personnel on an as-needed basis to such formations as the Einsatzgruppen. Such personnel, assigned to these auxiliary duties, was typically removed from the Gestapo chain of command and fell under the authority of other branches of the SS.

  What we learn from Gestapo practices:

1. Investigated and fought against all activities which might endanger in any sense the security of Germany.
2. Kept operations simple and effective. Take for example the “public places total control” method: agents were recruited, first of all, at every big restaurant, bar, hotel or store. They delivered information on any client whose behavior was somewhat different from the general one: he was too excited or too depressed, too greedy or too generous, too open or too closed, too well dressed or vise versa, etc. And very often such a client deserved special attention.
3. Aggressive total recruitment — by the end of World War II there wasn’t a single guerilla detachment, resistance or espionage group on occupied Soviet and European territories that had not been in part or completely eliminated by the GESTAPO or SD — 100 per cent professional counter-terrorist and counter-espionage job based on agent infiltration
4. The “Night and Fog” operation. By 1941 the RSHA analysts reported that the “taking hostages” practice was not effective any more as resistance on the occupied territories was even increasing after that went into effect. It was decided that resistance fighters had to be secretly arrested and secretly transported to Germany where, after investigation, they just vanished without a trace. The US in recent years has been taking insurgents and others arrested (often on suspicion alone) in Afghanistan, Iraq, and around the world, and transferring them via secret flights to secret jails in Eastern Europe and elsewhere for “interrogation”. One might have predicted that the public outcry would quickly stamp out any such abomination as the prison at Guantanamo, but as we see the “current incivilities” have already gone on longer than World War II and the camp is still there.
5. The Gestapo was abhorred for using “third degree” methods of interrogation (see “Special Influence”)
6 .The Gestapo had the power of the “protective custody”, a euphemism for the power to imprison people without judicial proceedings, typically in concentration camps. The person imprisoned even had to sign his or her own order declaring that the person had requested imprisonment (ostensibly out of fear  of personal harm) – the signature was forced by tortures. People were sent to concentration camps if they, according to the Gestapo opinion, had received too little punishment. It was not only left-wing politicians and trade union activists who were sent to concentration camps. (The Gestapo also arrested beggars, prostitutes, homosexuals, alcoholics, drug addicts and anyone who was incapable to work).
 Besides, the Gestapo, actually, copied the KGB (NKVD) very effective structure and experience; they even coordinated joint actions. In March 1940 representatives of NKVD and Gestapo met for one week in Zakopane, Poland to “pacificate” resistance in this country. Then the Soviet Union delivered hundreds of German and Austrian communists to Gestapo, as unwanted foregners, with relevant documents.
7.  British and Americans did not want to deal with anti-Nazi. First, it was due to the aftermath of the Venlo incident of 1939, when Gestapo agents posing  as anti-Nazis in the Nethrlands kidnapped two British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) officers lured to a meeting to discuss peace terms. That prompted Winston Churchill to ban any further contact with the German opposition. In addition, the allies did not want to contact anti-Nazis because they feared that  Soviet dictator Stalin would believe they were attempting to make deals behind his back.

Barack Obama 2012: CIA or KGB . Mikhail Kryzhanovsky

CIA                                                                                                 KGB
                                                           
Cuts corners to save money on intelligence.             No limitations.
Poor professional training and knowledge.               KGB is famous for brilliant analysts.
“Country inside country.”                                        Mostly patriots.
Results first. Use people and get rid of them.           Security first. Respect your sources.
Promise and forget.                                                Promise and do it.
Russia as #1 enemy.                                               US as #1 enemy.
 Money first.                                                         Job first.
 Alcohol.                                                              Alcohol.
“We are the best.”                                                "No, we are the best".
Unreformable.                                                      Too perfect to reform.

Barack Obama 2012: Espionage Golden Rules. Mikhail Kryzhanovsky, KGB

1. No mercy, no ideology, no emotions.
2. Intuition is nothing but the ability to watch and analyze.
3. No evidence is evidence in itself.
4. Distrust is a mother of security.
5. Never look as if you are sizing up the person — that’s a sign that gives away cops and spies.
6. Don’t start first if you don’t know the rules.
7. The way you act is the way you think — behavior is a system of codes (information) which could be calculated by the enemy. Watch your face — that’s a shop window.
8. Think fast, talk slow.
9. Avoid self-programming and never think bad about yourself.
10. Don’t smoke, drink or take drugs if it’s not necessary; spare your stomach from very hot or cold food or drinks; avoid too much noise and light.
11. Don’t be shy to lie — the more you lie the more people respect you.
12. Let people talk out and “empty their brains” — then load your information.
13. People never change — everybody wants to get pleasure and avoid pain.
14. “He knew too much” means “He talked too much.”
15. Never ask extra questions — wait. Wait and the object will get used to you and open himself — nobody can stay tense for long.
16. Lonely people live longer in espionage business.
17. “No exit” situation is the one you don’t like or don’t understand.
18. Avoid:
- personal enemies (they fix negative information on you)
- silent types (they notice and think too much)
- other professionals (they’ll blow your identity)
- extra stress (it damages your heart and blood vessels and that kills your brain and your ability to think )
- talking too  much

Barack Obama 2012: Diplomatic Tricks. 2. Mikhail Kryzhanovsky, KGB


Diplomatic Double Talk

Statement                                                    Meaning

 We are disappointed.                                            We got nothing.
 Situation disturbs us.                                              It’s unacceptable no matter what.
 There are still differences between                          There are huge differences.
 our approaches to the problem . 
 We can’t accept this deal.                                     This means trouble.
 We reserve the right to use any means
to prevent further worsening of the situation.             This means war.
 Discussion helped us to understand each     
other better.                                                           We’ve wasted our time.
 We don’t understand your attitude.                        Stop it immediately.
 I’m trying to understand your position.                    Understand me too, idiot!
 If I’ve understood you correctly, you don’t agree.    Do you have any other option?
 We both will pay a very high price if we don’t
 reach agreement.                                                    Yes, that’s a threat!


Body Language
It’s very good to have someone in your team who is attuned to, and can read, body language and help you to “crack” your opponent. Here are some signals (codes) and their meanings:
Partner is sitting upright with hands loosely crossed in front of him.         He is ready to accept proposal and finish negotiation.
Partner is smiling unnecessarily and is speaking fast.                            He’s nervous.
Partner looks and turns his lower body toward the exit.                           He wants to leave.
Open palm gesture.                                                                             I’m open and I’m telling the truth.
He’s leaning his body forward.                                                              He’s ready to assist you to get out of the situation.
Wide open eyes and a smile.                                                               He wants to be persuaded.
Raised eyebrows.                                                                                Negative surprise.
Chin rests on knuckles.                                                                       eady to listen (with interest).
Neutral facial expression.                                                                     Unformed opinion.
Gesturing a hand.                                                                                Adding emphasis.
Indirect gaze.                                                                                      Uncertainty.
Crossing arms or legs.                                                                         Disapproval.
Leaning back on a chair.                                                                      Boredom.
Leaning forward.                                                                                  Agreement.
His team’s members exchange glances.                                               They are sure they’ve won.

Barack Obama 2012: Diplomatic Tricks. Mikhail Kryzhanovsky, KGB


Diplomatic tricks

Tricks in diplomacy are usually used to distract your hard working team, shift the emphasis of the negotiation in order to shape the deal on terms of your adversary or manipulate your team into closing negotiation and accept terms you don’t really like. And the tricks are:
“Leap” - your adversary is losing and starts “jumping” from one point to another
“Pile” - your adversary “piles up” problems, tries to provoke a chaotic discussion or stop negotiations
“Empty chair” - a day or two before negotiations start your adversary informs you that he’s not ready yet, trying to press you (or he wants to change location)
“Diplomatic illness” – the practice of feigning  illness to avoid participation in negotiations and at the same time to avoid giving formal offense.
“Deaf” - your adversary keeps asking questions instead of answering yours
“Provocation” — your adversary doubts your team’s professional level and your ability to negotiate
“Busy guy” — your adversary breaks negotiation for an hour or two pretending he has to do some very important business (or that he got a very important call).
“Mirror” - it’s a very interesting “programming” trick. The technology is simple: you try to “mirror” your adversary’s style and behavior, adopt a similar posture, use his gestures, and follow the speed of his speech. First, he will like it subconsciously and will be more open to you. Second, you’ll understand better his way of thinking.
“Sandwich” - pressure (often — military) — negotiations — pressure
“Show” - using certain arguments your adversary appeals to your emotions
“Circle” - a very sophisticated trick: your adversary tries to “push” his proposal in different variants and finally comes back to his initial variant, trying to convince you that’s the best choice
“Carrot and stick” - threat (blackmail) plus promises (money). The guy could  blackmail you also by demanding to set a deadline
“Student” - your adversary talks too much about the details, asking a lot of minor questions, trying to make you nervous and make mistakes
“Donkey” – your adversary  declines the ofer to speak frst
“Ball” - encourage your adversary if he’s looking for “global decisions” and he’ll do a lot of minor favors
“Rubber” - delay, if you can’t predict the result, and press your adversary by delaying the answer
“Last train” - you can press your adversary by an ultimatum right before negotiations are over, if he really is interested in some result. “Spice” the  ultimatum with some important reasons and give your adversary a choice of variants.

Barack Obama 2012: Diplomacy Secrets. Mikhail Kryzhanovsky, KGB



 Diplomacy secrets

1. Use secret visits (send the National Security Adviser) if the international problem is complex and important — in this way you don’t depend on media and public opinion. Afterwards you can talk, if it was a success.
2. If presidents like to drink with each other, they are ready to deal with each other.
3. Avoid negotiating on major issues at the end of the day, when your energy is low.
4. Negotiate smart, watch your initiatives. The more you tell about your position, the less your partner will tell you about himself, and the higher price you’ll pay. Diplomacy is all about money and the essence of any negotiations is the price range.
5. Any information should be exchanged as a part of a compromise and not merely given away.
6. Always talk less than necessary. Concentrate on facts and never tell other person about feelings (or your family and medical problems). Don’t interrupt others, try  to understand what they really want and if they try to manipulate you. Also, resist giving in to interruptions until you have completed your thoughts – “Just a moment, I haven’t finished”. Use  Taleyran approximation – if it’s difficult for you to speak up, try to make just one diplomatic statement. If they press you, insist on moving this questions to experts. And use indirect language  such as “It looks like” or  “You see situation from a very special angle”.
7. No negative emotions - strong emotions indicate weak nerves. Realize that there might be other issues motivating the other person’s behavior and never take things personally.
8. Stop self-limiting behaviors, such as smiling too much, nodding too much, tilting your head or dropping your eyes in response to other person’s gaze. Speak I normal conversational volume, don’t scream and don’t  whisper, either, as you won’t be taken seriously.
9. Take a problem-solving approach to conflict, and try to see the other person as your collaborator rather than your opposition. You’d better postpone negotiations than allow them to break down.
10. Fix all questions and don’t be in a rush to answer any of them.
11. The slower you talk, the more confident you are.
12. Never ask straight questions.
13. It’s important to know what questions and when you have to ask. Start with an “invitation” question that does not need a definite answer but opens up the discussion, like: “No matter what reporters say, we’ll start negotiating for arms control.” Proceed with “intelligence gathering” questions, like: “Are you going to abide by our last agreement on the withdrawal of military forces or do we have other options?” Go to “expertise” questions, like: “It’s 5000 soldiers, right? ”
 There’s a difference between expertise and straight questions - straight question are like: “Will you sign the treaty?” and these have to be avoided because you’ll get no straight answer right away. Finish with a closing question, like: “I think that’s what we intend to sign? Next time we can start from here.” Or you can press your partner: “Let’s not lose this last opportunity, eh?”
14. Explain your negative attitude in a smart way: give half the information and continue, depending on your partner’s reaction. If you can’t accept his proposal, tell him that the experts may look into it again and come to agreement. If your partner is not a complete idiot he’ll understand his proposal is unacceptable (because the experts have already done all they could). But if he is an idiot, he’ll agree to “kill” his proposals by passing them to the experts.
You start to lose momentum if you start to defend yourself.
15. Stop (postpone) negotiations the moment you start to lose or you could end up in a total failure and that could be used by opposition back home.
16. If you bring ideology - try to win. If you bring national interests, try to find compromise. Be flexible — that’s a sign of strength, not weakness.
17. Don’t make aggressive statements for the media, no matter what.
18. Respect is half a victory, but you usually win when your partner is scared. Avoid open confrontation and respond to personal attacks with humor.
19. Watch the military experts -  they are always ready to “push” you. No arms agreement can win ratification without backing from Joint Chiefs, because Congress needs and trusts their expertise, and their disapproval is a strong tool against you in case you ignore their advice. So, think three times before you appoint Joint Chiefs.
20. Take negotiations on the trade deficit very seriously — they often take you nowhere and have zero results as your partner wants you to change your attitude to him completely as well as your international economic policy, while you expect the same favor from him. You can influence one partner but you can’t very easily influence the international system.
21. After you come back home do some positive advertising through the media — in such a way you influence other presidents and future negotiations. If the negotiations resulted in a treaty, “sell” it to the Senate for approval.
22. Negotiation no-nos:- don’t be confused if your partner threatens you — that means he needs your cooperation. Don’t enter into negotiation right away with high demands.
- don’t touch the toughest issues first. Don’t assume — that’s a sign of weakness.
- don’t hesitate to pause or take a break.
- never say “no” to your partner’s ideas — rather, pack them up in one “package” with your proposals. The Reykjavik American-Soviet summit (1986) on intermediate-range nuclear missiles is a perfect example of a “package”. The U.S. President Reagan wanted to include human rights, Jewish immigration and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in the talks. The USSR President Michail Gorbachev said “no”, arms control only. Then Gorbachev attacked – he wanted to put American Strategic Defense Initiative (“Star Wars”) in one “package” with eliminating intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe and reducing NATO tactical weapons and Warsaw Pact conventional forces. Reagan kissed him “good-bye”.